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BINDING CHOICES: TAX ELECTIONS &
FEDERAL/STATE CONFORMITY
Heather M Field
The federal government wields tremendous power over state fiscal
policy because most states' income tax laws conform, at least to some
degree, to the federal income tax laws. Extensive literature discusses the
advantages and disadvantages of this tax base conformity, but scholars
generally assume that the question facing state governments is to what
extent the state tax provisions should conform to the federal tax provisions.
Where the federal tax law provides explicit tax elections (e.g., a married
couple's choice to file jointly or separately), however, state legislators must
decide not only whether the state law will conform to the federal law (i.e.,
affording taxpayers the same choice for state tax purposes), but legislators
must also decide whether to bind each taxpayer, for state tax purposes, to
the taxpayer's federal tax choices. This additional decision matters because
the simplicity, administrability, and revenue implications of election
conformity can depend on whether and how state legislators constrain the
taxpayer autonomy provided by the elections. Further, this additional
decision presents a fundamental federalism question about how power over
state fiscal policy should be allocated among the federal government, the
state government, and the taxpayers themselves. Yet, despite the large
number of tax elections in the federal income tax law, the existing literature
regarding federal/state tax base conformity fails to provide guidance about
how state legislators considering conformity to federal tax law should take
into account the optionality inherent in explicit elections. This article fills
that gap.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I itemized deductions on my 2011 federal income tax return, but I took
the standard deduction on my 2011 state income tax return. California,
where I live, allows a taxpayer to make an independent choice about
whether to itemize for state income tax purposes, regardless of the
itemization choice made by the taxpayer for federal income tax purposes.
2
Virginia does not. New York does in some circumstances, but not in
others. 3 In New Jersey, this issue is irrelevant.4
1 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 17073, 17073.5 (West 2012); see also OR. REV. STAT.
§ 316.695(l)(c)(A) (2012) (also allowing taxpayers to choose to itemize or to take the
standard deduction for Oregon state purposes, regardless of a taxpayer's federal election).
2 VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-322(D)(1)(a) (2012). Virginia taxpayers who itemize for
federal tax purposes must itemize for state tax purposes, and Virginia taxpayers who take the
standard deduction for federal tax purposes can only take the standard deduction for state tax
purposes. Id. In Vermont, a taxpayer's decision to itemize or take the standard deduction for
federal tax purposes is binding on the taxpayer for state tax purposes too, but in Vermont,
this is implicit in the way Vermont's state tax conforms to the federal tax. Vermont's base
for federal conformity is federal taxable income, so the taxpayer's choice between itemized
and standard deductions is already incorporated into the taxpayer's Vermont taxable income
without any action required. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 5811(21), 5820, 5824 (2012).
N.Y. TAX LAW § 615(a) (2012); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, §§ 113.1,
114.1 (2012). New York allows taxpayers who itemize for federal tax purposes to elect
whether to itemize for New York tax purposes or whether to take the standard deduction for
New York purposes. The same option is not provided to taxpayers who take the standard
deduction for federal income tax purposes.
4 New Jersey state income tax law only allows a limited number of specified
deductions, so New Jersey taxpayers lack the standard deduction/itemized deduction choice
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Fewer than three percent of married couples in Montana file separate
federal income tax returns, but almost fifty-six percent of married couples
in Montana file separate state income tax returns.5 In Montana and in
several other states, a married couple is generally allowed to make an
independent choice about filing status for state purposes, regardless of the
filing status elected for federal income tax purposes. In contrast, a majority
of states that impose income taxes requires each married couple 6 to use the
same filing status as the couple uses for federal tax purposes.7 Policymakers
provided by the Code. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A:1-2(c), 2-1, 3-1 to 3-8, 5-1 (West 2012).
5 Memorandum from Dan Dodds, Tax Policy Analyst, Mont. Dep't of Revenue, to
Dan Bucks, Dir., Mont. Dep't of Revenue (Sept. 18, 2009), available at
http://revenue.mt.gov/content/committees/legislativeinterimcommittee/married
filing separately.pdf (citing data regarding tax returns for 2007). I mention Montana because
Montana is considering whether to require married couples to use the same filing status for
state purposes as they use for federal purposes. S.J. Res. 37, 61st Leg. (Mont. 2009); H.R.J.
Res. 13, 62d Leg. (Mont. 2011). Married couples in several states can use different filing
statuses for state and federal income tax purposes. For example, Vice-President Joseph
Biden and Dr. Jill Biden filed jointly for federal income tax purposes and separately for
Delaware state income tax purposes. See Joseph Biden & Jill Biden, Del. Individual Resident
Income Tax Return, Form 200-01 for Taxable Year 2011, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
vp biden complete return_2011 .pdf.
6 Given the differences between the federal definition of marriage and the definition
of marriage in several states, any mandatory consistency would necessarily be limited to
those couples that are treated as "married" for both federal and state purposes.
7 See JEFF MARTIN, STATE OF MONT. LEGISLATIVE SERVS., BACKGROUND REPORT ON
MONTANA'S INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX, S. 61, 2009 Sess., at 4 (2009), available at
http://leg.mt.gov/content/Committees/Interim/2009 2010/Revenueand_
Transportation/Staff Reports/BACKGROUND 09SEPT.pdf (identifying states that require
married couples to use the same filing status for state purposes as they used for federal
purposes). States often provide limited exceptions, such as in the case where one spouse is a
resident of the particular state and the other spouse is not. See, e.g., MONT. ADMIN. R.
42.15.321(1) (2012). Also, many states that allow married couples to file separately give
those couples two filing options: filing separately on separate forms, or filing separately on
the same form. See, e.g., MONT. ADMIN. R. 42.15.322 (2012); 2010 Mont. Individual Income
Tax Return, Form 2, items 3b, 3c; see also JARET COLES, STATE OF MONT. LEGISLATIVE
SERVS., OVERVIEW OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX FILING OPTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES,
MONTANA, AND THE OTHER STATES, AS WELL AN EVALUATION OF BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS
IN REVISING MONTANA'S RATE SCHEDULES, S. 61, 2009 Sess., at 7 (2010), available at
http://leg.mt.gov/content/Committees/Interim/2009_2010/Revenue and
Transportation/MeetingDocuments/Feb%2018&1 9%202010/OverviewTaxFiling.pdf
(explaining that "the ability to file separately on the same form was implemented [in
Montana] by the Department of Revenue in 1972, because it was difficult to obtain and
compare two married filing separate returns for one couple during an audit or review."). For




in Montana are considering whether to change state law to adopt the
majority approach.8
Taxpayers can elect to treat some sales of corporate stock as deemed
asset sales for federal income tax purposes,9 but in a few states, taxpayers
can simultaneously opt to treat the transactions as stock sales for state
income tax purposes.'0 States vary as to whether they require and/or allow
conformity to federal section 338(h)(10) elections, which tax actual stock
acquisitions as deemed asset acquisitions. I Over the past several years,
state courts and policymakers in Alabama, California, Georgia,
Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia, among other states, have struggled
with this issue. 12
8 S.J. Res. 37, 61st Leg. (Mont. 2009); H.R.J. Res. 13, 62d Leg. (Mont. 2011); see
also supra notes 5, 7.
9I.R.C. § 338(h)(10).
10 California explicitly allows taxpayers to do this. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 24451,
23051.5(e) (2012) (allowing taxpayers to make different elections, including for section
338(h)(10) elections); Cal. Franchise Tax Bd., Legal Notice 2006-3 (Sept. 28, 2006). The
California legislature has considered legislation, however, that would require taxpayers to
make the same election for California purposes as is made for federal tax purposes. See
Kathleen K. Wright, An Odd Choice in California: Pension Conformity or Independent
Elections, 23 ST. TAx NOTES 887 (Mar. 11, 2002) (discussing the proposed legislation).
I See BNA, SPECIAL REPORT: 2011 SURVEY OF STATE TAX DEPARTMENTS, at S-93 to
S-102 (Vol. 18 No. 4 2011) (surveying the different state approaches to this question).
Among other section 338(h)(10) issues on which states may differ: (1) a state may only
conform to the section 338(h)(10) election for C corporation or S corporation target
companies; (2) a state may require taxpayers to file a separate election for state purposes; (3)
a state may allow taxpayers to decline to make a state election, even if a federal election is in
effect; and (4) a state may allow taxpayers to make the state election even if no federal
election is made. Id.
12 For example, in 2010, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that a federal section
338(h)(10) election did not apply to a particular transaction for Georgia state corporate
income tax purposes. Trawick Constr. Co. v. Ga. Dep't. Rev., 286 Ga. 597 (Ga. 2010)
(reversing the Georgia Court of Appeals' ruling that the election was effective for state
purposes, which reversed the Georgia Superior Court's ruling that the election was not
effective for state purposes, which rejected the Georgia Revenue Commissioner's position
that the election was effective for state purposes, which disregarded the administrative law
judge's determination that the election was not effective for state purposes). In response to
the Georgia Supreme Court ruling, the Georgia legislature enacted legislation explicitly
providing that all subsequent federal section 338 elections will also apply for state tax
purposes. 2010 Ga. Laws 627, § 2 (amending GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-21(b)(5) (West 2012)).
New York also recently changed its law to negate a ruling which concluded that a
federal section 338(h)(10) election for an S corporation did not apply for state tax purposes.
Baum, N.Y. Tax App. Trib. Nos. 820837, 820838, (Feb. 12, 2009) (holding that the
transaction was a stock sale, and not a deemed asset sale, for New York tax purposes, and
thus the mere sale of stock by nonresident shareholders produced non-New York source
income); 2010 N.Y. Laws Ch. 57 A. 9710-D, codified at N.Y. TAX LAW § 632(a)(2) (2011)
2013] 531
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All three of these examples pose the same basic question - should
taxpayers be required to make consistent federal and state tax elections?
States have a vested interest in the answer to this question. This question
raises issues of state sovereignty and fiscal federalism. This question affects
taxpayer compliance and the cost of administering and enforcing the state
income tax system. Additionally, given that tax elections give taxpayers
opportunities to reduce their tax liabilities, this question impacts state tax
revenue, 13 thereby presenting a fundamental question about how power
over state fiscal policy should be allocated among the federal government,
the state governments, and taxpayers themselves.
Most state income tax regimes use federal income tax information as a
starting point for the determination of a taxpayer's state income tax
liability.14 Thus, given the large (and increasing)16 number of explicit tax
elections' 7 available in the federal income tax system, state legislators
(reversing the Baum ruling and explicitly providing that nonresident shareholders are to be
taxed on their share of the gain from the deemed asset sale); see generally JEROME R.
HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION 7.14 (3d ed. 2012) (discussing the
"conformity issues raised by elections under Section 338," providing details about a section
338(h)(10) conformity controversy in Massachusetts, and citing conformity cases in a variety
of additional states).
Much of the state-level controversy about section 338(h)(10) conformity centers on
whether the election is respected for state tax purposes (specifically with respect to
nonresident shareholders); whether the election is made for state purposes if the state does
not recognize consolidated/combined groups for state tax purposes; whether the election is
made for state purposes if the state does not recognize S corporations (or if the state does not
recognize the particular target corporation as an S corporation); whether gain from a section
338(h)(10) transaction is treated as apportionable business income or allocable nonbusiness
income; and/or whether (and how) that gain affects the sales factor for apportionment
purposes.
13 Any impact on revenue is particularly important during this time of fiscal crisis. See
State Budget Update: March 2011, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 19,
2011), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/marchSBU2011freeversion.pdf (providing
basic information about the budget and revenue situation for each of the 50 states).
14 State Personal Income Taxes: Federal Starting Points, FED'N OF TAX ADM'RS (Jan.
1, 2011), http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/stgpts.pdf (identifying the conformity starting
point for each state).
15 See ANTHONY J. DECHELLIS & KAREN L. HORNE, PRACTITIONERS PUBL'G Co., TAX
ELECTIONS DESKBOOK (16th ed. 2010) (discussing over 300 federal income tax elections).
16 See, e.g., Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240, § 202 1(b), 124
Stat. 2504, 2505 (adding a new election to section 179, pursuant to which a taxpayer can
elect to treat qualified real property as section 179 property).
17 As used herein, "explicit tax election" refers to a provision pursuant to which "the
taxpayer merely tells the Internal Revenue Service how he wishes to be treated for tax
purposes[,]" and where the taxpayer "need not take any specific non-tax actions or structure
his financial or legal dealings in any particular way in order to obtain his preferred tax
532 [Vol. 32:527
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ought to consider carefully whether and how to incorporate these explicit
-18elections into state income tax regimes.
Generally, the literature about conformity between the federal and state
income tax regimes19 implicitly assumes that the question facing state
governments is to what extent (if at all) the state income tax laws should
conform to the federal income tax laws. Where the federal income tax
provides taxpayers with explicit tax elections, however, it is not enough for
state governments to decide whether the state income tax law will conform
to the federal income tax law. That decision only determines whether the
state tax law will provide the same choice that the federal tax law provides.
Where there are explicit tax elections in the federal income tax law, state
legislators must also determine whether a taxpayer should be bound, for
state income tax purposes, to the election choice that the taxpayer made for
federal income tax purposes. Yet, the existing literature regarding
federal/state tax conformity does not provide guidance as to how state
legislators facing the election conformity question should take into account
the optionality inherent in explicit elections. This article fills that gap.
Of course, the question about the relationship between a taxpayer's
state-level tax election and the taxpayer's federal-level tax election could be
addressed by federal, rather than state, legislators. Congress could mandate
conformity, or Congress could use incentives to encourage states to require
that taxpayers make consistent federal and state tax elections.20 This article,
however, approaches the question primarily from the perspective of state
legislators because (1) there is recent interest in the tax election conformity
question at the state level, but there seems to be no indication of interest in
this question at the federal level;21 (2) state tax legislators are better situated
treatment." Heather M. Field, Choosing Tax: Explicit Elections as an Element of Design in
the Federal Income Tax System, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 21, 22 (2010). Examples used herein
include (1) a taxpayer's ability to elect to itemize deductions or to take the standard
deduction; (2) a married couple's ability to elect whether to file federal income tax returns
jointly or separately; and (3) buyer and seller's ability to elect to treat a qualified stock
purchase as an asset acquisition under section 338.
18 Some commentators criticize tax elections. See Field, supra note 17, at 26-33
(explaining the criticisms). Nevertheless, this article assumes the continued existence of
explicit tax elections in the federal income tax system. Regardless of the policy merits of
providing tax elections, state policymakers will face the decision about conformity to tax
elections as long as elections continue to be present in the federal tax system.
19 See infra Part II.A.
20 See, e.g., Darien Shanske, How Less Can Be More: Using the Federal Income Tax
to Stabilize State and Local Finance, 31 VA. TAX REV. 413 (2012); Kirk J. Stark, The
Federal Role in State Tax Reform, 30 VA. TAX REV. 407 (2010) (discussing how federal rules
and institutions can be designed to influence the content of state tax laws).
21 See, e.g., supra notes 5, 8, and accompanying text (discussing the interest of the
2013] 533
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than federal legislators to consider whether taxpayers should be required to
make the same choice at the state level as they made at the federal level; 22
and (3) the state legislator perspective is largely missing from the literature
regarding tax base conformity in general. The existing literature typically
focuses on the perspective of federal legislators, arguing that the prevalence
of conformity means that Congress should consider how potential changes
to the federal tax laws could affect states. 23
Approaching the issues from the perspective of state legislators, this
article argues that, to make informed decisions about state conformity to
federal tax elections, state legislators must understand how the traditional
conformity analysis is affected by the individual taxpayer autonomy
provided by explicit elections. As with conformity questions in general, the
question of whether a state should conform to a federal tax election raises
concerns about federalism and state autonomy. The simplicity,
administrability, enforceability, and revenue effects of state conformity to
federal tax elections are largely indeterminate, however, without knowing
whether taxpayers' federal tax elections are binding on the taxpayers for
state tax purposes. Binding taxpayers to their federal elections can simplify
recordkeeping, ease the tax preparation burden for taxpayers, lower the risk
of taxpayer mistake, increase the state's ability to benefit from Internal
Revenue Service (Service) enforcement efforts, and reduce opportunities
Montana legislature in the election conformity and binding issue), note 10 (California), and
note 12 (New York and Georgia); see also, e.g., Roy E. Crawford & Russell D. Uzes,
Income Taxes: The Distinction Between Business and Nonbusiness Income, BNA STATE TAX
PORTFOLIOS: CORPORATE INCOME TAXES, 1140-1st, 1140.06B(7) (explaining that "[a]
number of states with combined reporting are currently in the process of determining how to
apply the state version of [the election in] I.R.C. § 338(h)(10) to nonunitary corporations [for
state income tax purposes]").
22 This is because state legislators are already deciding whether to provide, for
purposes of state tax law, the tax election that is provided at the federal level. Thus, the state
legislators can easily consider the binding issue at the same time. In contrast, federal
legislators, who generally have not considered the question of whether there will be
state/federal conformity to the provision of the election, are less well positioned to determine
whether a taxpayer's federal choice ought to be binding (assuming the states do, in fact,
conform to the provision of the election).
23 See, e.g., Jane G. Gravelle & Jennifer Gravelle, How Federal Policymakers Account
for the Concerns of State and Local Governments in the Formulation of Federal Tax Policy,
60 NAT'L TAX J. 631, 640-43 (2007); Ruth Mason, Delegating Up: State Conformity with the
Federal Tax Base, 62 DuKE L. J. at 9-10 (forthcoming 2013) (discussing "vertical
harmonization benefits"); Ruth Mason, Federalism and the Taxing Power, 99 CALIF. L. REV.
975, 1019-21 (2011); Charles E. McLure, Jr., How to Coordinate State and Local Sales
Taxes with a Federal Value Added Tax, 63 TAX L. REv. 639, 710 (2010); Stark, supra note




for tax arbitrage. Additionally, binding taxpayers to their federal elections
can affect state revenue (up or down, depending on the alignment and
magnitude of taxpayers' federal and state tax election preferences) and
reduce the risk that multi-state taxpayers are less than or more than fully
taxed at the state level.
Allowing taxpayers to make independent choices, on the other hand,
may simplify taxpayers' decision-making process about what election(s) to
make. This would further the policy benefits of providing the election
(where state legislators believe the election, and not just conformity thereto,
advances desirable policy objectives), advance individual taxpayer
autonomy, and more clearly reflect a conception of the state income tax
regime as separate and distinct from the federal income tax regime.
Independent choices do reduce state revenue, however. The magnitude of
these costs and benefits of binding (or not binding) taxpayers, for state
purposes, to their federal tax elections can vary depending on the degree of
conformity (e.g., whether the state tax laws conform to the current year's
federal income tax or to the federal income tax as of a particular date in the
past) and on the method through which the taxpayer is bound or afforded an
independent choice (e.g., whether a taxpayer's federal election is deemed to
be made for state purposes or whether a taxpayer must affirmatively make a
state-level election that matches the federal election).
Legislators in different states may ultimately make different decisions
about whether to conform to federal tax elections and, where conforming
elections are provided, about whether (and how) to bind taxpayers to their
federal tax choices. This article provides guidance to legislators facing these
decisions. Specifically, this article argues that state legislators should be
wary of providing for, or allowing, deviation from a taxpayer's federal tax
election (i.e., by decoupling from the federal election or by allowing
taxpayers to make independent choices for conforming state elections) (a) if
the tax election arises prior to the state's federal conformity starting point
(e.g., a taxpayer's election whether to itemize or take the standard
deduction, if the determination of state taxable income begins with the
taxpayer's federal taxable income, rather than the taxpayer's federal
adjusted gross income), or (b) if such deviation could require, for state tax
compliance and enforcement purposes, information that is not provided on
the federal tax return (e.g., if a taxpayer who took the standard deduction
for federal purposes wants to itemize for state purposes). Particularly in
these situations, state legislators should inquire whether state-specific
policy objectives can be accomplished another way, without decoupling
from the election and without allowing independent choice. Further, this
article argues that state legislators who value state-level decision-making
autonomy should be wary of answering the tax election conformity question
5352013]
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in a way that raises the likelihood of multiple state taxation for multi-state
taxpayers, that significantly exacerbates compliance complexity for multi-
state taxpayers, that exports taxation to nonresidents, or that otherwise
creates externalities for other states (and their taxpayers), thereby possibly
spurring the federal government to intervene.
The article will proceed as follows. Part II provides background on the
existing literature regarding state/federal tax conformity and explains how
the conformity question is presented where the federal income tax law
provides explicit elections. Part III analyzes whether states should decouple
state income tax law from explicit elections provided by the federal income
tax. For those circumstances in which state tax law conforms to the
provision of the federal tax election, Part IV explores the concept of
taxpayer consistency, and Part V addresses whether and how states should
treat a taxpayer's federal choice as binding on the taxpayer for state
purposes. Part VI applies this article's analysis to the three examples of
explicit elections with which this introduction began: a taxpayer's choice to
itemize deductions or take the standard deduction; a married couple's
choice to file jointly or separately; and the choice of parties to a taxable
acquisition to tax the acquisition as an actual stock sale or as a deemed asset
sale. Part VII concludes.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE ELECTION CONFORMITY QUESTION
After providing background regarding states' differing approaches to
federal conformity, this section will briefly summarize the literature
regarding the benefits and detriments of such conformity. Then, this section
will argue that the existing literature provides incomplete guidance where
the federal income tax law provides taxpayers with explicit elections.
A. Federal/State Conformity, In General
Although states have increasingly decoupled from specific federal tax
provisions,24 state income tax laws generally conform to federal income tax
laws.25 Each state approaches conformity slightly differently. States diverge
24 See, e.g., Rebecca Bertothy & Jon Belteau, Stimulating the States - Are They
Getting a Boost from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act?, J. MULTISTATE TAX'N
& INCENTIVES, Jan. 2010, at 12 (discussing trends for decoupling, including with respect to
recent federal bonus depreciation and small business expensing provisions, and with respect
to federal section 108(i), allowing deferral of recognition from certain cancellation of debt
income).
25 See Wis. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX PROVISIONS IN THE
STATES: INFORMATIONAL PAPER 4 (2011) (identifying ways in which each state's income tax
regime conforms to or differs from the federal income tax regime).
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as to whether they use federal taxable income or federal adjusted gross
income as the starting point for the calculation of state taxable income.26
State income taxes vary as to whether they conform to the current year's
federal income tax (rolling conformity) or whether they conform to the
federal income tax as of a particular date (fixed-date conformity).27 Further,
states differ in the number and type of state-specific modifications that
taxpayers are required to make.28 Depending on a state's particular
approach to conformity, taxpayers may be able to make the state-specific
modifications using only the information that is already provided on their
federal tax returns (facial or recordkeeping conformity), or additional
information that is not provided on the federal tax return may be needed for
compliance and enforcement purposes (non-facial conformity).29
Thus, a state's degree of conformity may range in strength, from very
strong (e.g., federal tax liability or federal taxable income as the conformity
starting point, rolling conformity, and very few state-specific modifications,
none of which result in non-facial conformity) to significantly weaker (e.g.,
federal adjusted gross income as the conformity starting point, conformity
fixed to a date years in the past, and many state-specific modifications that
result in non-facial conformity). While the desirability of conformity can
depend on the degree and details of a state's approach to conformity,
conformity can generally provide significant benefits to taxpayers and
states. These benefits come at a cost, however.
1. Benefits of Conformity, In General
The literature discusses the many benefits of state conformity to federal
tax.30 For taxpayers, state conformity to federal tax laws simplifies tax
26 The vast majority of states that impose a personal income tax use federal adjusted
gross income (rather than federal taxable income) as the conformity starting point. See
HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, 1 20.02; Wis. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU,
supra note 25; State Personal Income Taxes: Federal Starting Points, supra note 14. Almost
all states imposing a corporate income tax use federal taxable income as the state starting
point. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, 17.02. States could also use federal
tax liability as the starting point for calculating the amount of state tax liability (for either the
personal or corporate income tax), but that approach is rarely used.
27 See State Personal Income Taxes: Federal Starting Points, supra note 14 (listing
which version of the Code is adopted by each conforming state).
28 See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, 7.03.
29 Richard D. Pomp, Restructuring a State Income Tax in Response to the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, 36 TAx NOTES 1195, 1199-1205 (Sept. 21, 1987) (using this terminology to
discuss different degrees of conformity and also discussing "absolute conformity," where
there are no state modifications to the chosen federal starting point).
30 This section's brief description draws heavily from the literature regarding the
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preparation, reduces the risk of mistakes, and eases compliance.31 Among
other benefits,32 taxpayers need not keep separate records for federal and
state purposes, so conformity can reduce taxpayers' recordkeeping burdens.
Additionally, where the federal and state tax treatments align, it is easier for
taxpayers to take tax issues into account when making business decisions.
Moreover, for taxpayers who pay taxes in multiple states, the benefits of
conformity are magnified if many of these states' tax laws conform to the
federal tax laws. 33
For states, conformity to federal tax laws can increase the
administrability of the state tax laws and can lower the cost of that
administration. The stronger the conformity, the more that states can rely on
"the Internal Revenue Service's superior capacity for enforcement,"34 on
interaction between the federal and state tax regimes. See supra note 23 (citing additional
articles on which this section draws); see also, e.g., HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note
12, 17.02[4]; Walter Hellerstein, Selected Issues in State Business Taxation, 39 VAND. L.
REV. 1033, 1038-41 (1986); Allison L. Westfahl Kong, The Effects of Federal Tax
Expenditures Policy on the States, 58 ST. TAX NOTES 475, 476-81 (Nov. 15, 2010); LeAnn
Luna & Ann Boyd Watts, Federal Tax Legislative Changes and State Conformity, 47 ST.
TAX NOTES 619 (Feb. 25, 2008); Michael Mazerov & Dan R. Bucks, Federal Tax
Restructuring and State and Local Governments: An Introduction to the Issues and the
Literature, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1459 (1996); Kathryn L. Moore, State andLocal Taxation:
When Will Congress Intervene?, 23 J. LEGIS. 171, 179-82 (1997); Pomp, supra note 29, at
1199-1205; Frank Shafroth, To Conform or Not to Conform - That is the Question, 29 ST.
TAX NOTES 711 (Sept. 8. 2003); Richard Weiss, Achieving Uniformity in State Income Taxes:
A Worthwhile Goal, J. MULTISTATE TAX'N & INCENTIVES, Sept. 2008, at 7; Edwin S. Cohen,
State Income Tax Conformity: Knotty Problems in the Branches of the Federal Tree, WM. &
MARY ANNUAL TAx CONFERENCE, Paper 633 (1967), available at
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/tax/633; Harley T. Duncan, Relationships Between Federal
and State Income Taxes, FED'N OF TAX ADM'RS (April 2005),
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/taxreformpanel/meetings/pdf/incometax_04182005.pdf. Many
additional resources are not listed.
31 The stronger the conformity, the greater the benefits described in this section will
be. As the degree of conformity weakens, however, the compliance, simplicity, and
administrability benefits described in this section generally decrease. See Pomp, supra note
29,at1199-1205.
32 Cf Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90
MICH. L. REV. 895, 920-21 (1992) (explaining that nonconformity between federal and state
tax laws can be problematic because it "requires taxpayers (1) to know about a host of
different rules, (2) separately to exercise judgment about the application of different
jurisdictions' rules, (3) to engage in separate numerical calculations . . . , (5) to file multiple
forms - not only tax returns, but information reports, requests for extensions, reports of tax
return adjustments required by other jurisdictions, and the like, and (6) to engage in a host of
parallel interactions with government officials, such as auditors and legislators.").
33 Mason, Delegating Up, supra note 23, at 11-15 (discussing benefits of
harmonization of the tax base between states).
34 Super, supra note 23, at 2595.
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third-party reporting information that is already required by the federal
government, and on opportunities for data exchanges with the Service. 35
Similarly, conformity allows states to rely on well-developed federal
regulations, Service guidance, and federal cases that interpret the relevant
tax provisions.36 All of these synergies help to reduce both taxpayer fraud
and the amount of state resources spent on enforcement and administration
of the state tax system. 37
In addition, since conformity generally makes compliance easier for
taxpayers, greater conformity with federal tax laws can increase a state's
ability to "attract capital with the promise of lower tax-planning
expenses." 38 Said differently, lack of conformity can hurt a state's business
climate, particularly for businesses that operate in multiple states.39
Conformity may also benefit the federal government because
decoupling can result in state tax policies that undermine the economic
and/or social policy objectives of the federal tax laws. Moreover, from a
multi-state, rather than individual state, perspective, tax base conformity
can curb the ability of taxpayers to engage in tax planning to take advantage
35 See T. Keith Fogg, Transparency in Private Collection of Federal Taxes, 10 FLA.
TAX REV. 763, 793 (2011); Ralph B. Tower & Caroline M. Boyd, Tax Base Modifications:
The Hidden Barrier to Simplification, 41 ST. TAX NOTES 165 (July 17, 2006). A closely
related benefit is that conformity also provides opportunities for federal and state
administrators to cooperate on enforcement actions and on efforts to improve tax
administration. Duncan, supra note 30, 6.3; see also Mildred Wigfall Robinson, The
States' Stake and Role in Closing the Federal "Tax Gap ", 28 VA. TAX REV. 959, 974-80
(2009).
36 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, 7.02[4]. But see NICHOLAS JOHNSON
& ASHALI SINGHAM, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, STATES CAN OPT OUT OF THE
COSTLY AND INEFFECTIVE "DOMESTIC PRODUCTION DEDUCTION" CORPORATE TAX BREAK 3
(updated Jan. 14, 2010) ("States that conform to federal provisions [which are complex and
difficult for taxpayers to understand] risk becoming involved with these difficult and time-
consuming enforcement issues.").
3 Brian Galle, A Republic of the Mind: Cognitive Biases, Fiscal Federalism, and
Section 164 of the Tax Code, 82 IND. L.J. 673, 701-03 (2007); Mazerov & Bucks, supra note
30, at 1460-61; Super, supra note 23, at 2595.
38 Galle, supra note 37, at 703. Alternatively, states may try to attract capital by
decoupling, if the decoupled state provision provides greater tax incentive for capital
investment than the conformed tax provision would have. This reduces revenue, however,
and creates potentially harmful interstate tax competition.
39 See Thomas 0. Armstrong, Statement Before the Senate Finance Committee of the
Pennsylvania State Senate on Pennsylvania's Business Tax Structure, TAX FOUNDATION
(May 11, 2004), http://taxfoundation.org/article/statement-senate-finance-committee-
pennsylvania-state-senate-pennsylvanias-business-tax-structure (discussing the Tax
Foundation's analysis regarding the business tax climate in different states, and using "tax
base conformity" as one of the "five major elements of the tax system" that impact
businesses).
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of disparate laws in different states, thereby avoiding full state-level
taxation;40 reduce the risk of double taxation;41 curtail harmful tax
competition;42 and limit states' abilities to export taxes to nonresidents. 43
2. Costs of Conformity, In General
Despite the foregoing benefits, conformity can raise significant
concems.44 Where states conform to the federal income tax laws, state tax
bases narrow as Congress adds tax expenditures to the federal income tax
law. As a result, federal tax changes can reduce state tax revenue, 45 and this
40 Shaviro, supra note 32, at 911 ("Tax base disparities present obvious planning
opportunities for both taxpayers and governments."); see also, e.g., Michael T. Petrik &
Ethan D. Millar, State and Local Tax Aspects of Corporate Acquisitions, CORP. Bus. TAX'N
MONTHLY, Dec. 2006, at 13-21, 27-29 (discussing planning opportunities to exploit
differences in state definitions of business and non-business income that enable taxable
acquisitions to be "less than fully taxed at the state level.").
41 Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 278-79 (1978) (acknowledging
that non-uniform state approaches to apportioning income can lead to multiple taxation);
Shaviro, supra note 32, at 916 ("States can opportunistically choose whatever [tax] base,
within the permissible range, appears most favorable to themselves, and thereby collectively
engage in effective multiple taxation.").
42 Mason, Delegating Up, supra note 23, at 12 (arguing that tax base conformity can
"productively channel state tax competition").
43 Shaviro, supra note 32, at 908 (arguing that differences in the tax burdens between
jurisdictions raises fairness concerns when the differences allow one jurisdiction to place tax
burdens on outsiders).
4 This very brief discussion draws heavily on the rich literature regarding state fiscal
volatility, state sovereignty, and fiscal federalism, as relevant in the tax context, including
many of the works cited supra Part II.A.1. See also, e.g., Richard M. Bird, Fiscal
Federalism, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION AND TAX POLICY 146 (Joseph J. Cordes et
al. eds., 2005); John Dane, Jr., Problems Involved in Conforming a State Income Tax System
with the Federal Law, 47 TAXES 94 (1969); Daniel L. Hatcher, Poverty Revenue: The
Subversion of Fiscal Federalism, 52 Aiuz. L. REv. 675, 682-84 (2010); Charles E. McLure,
Jr., Understanding the Nuttiness of State Tax Policy: When States Have Both Too Much
Sovereignty and Not Enough, 58 NAT'L TAX J. 565 (2005); Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on
Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1120 (1999); David E. Wildasin, Pre-Emption:
Federal Statutory Intervention in State Taxation, 60 NAT'L TAX J. 649,653-55 (2007).
45 Stark, supra note 20, at 424-25 (discussing volatility of state tax revenues,
particularly where state taxes conform to a significant degree with federal taxes); Super,
supra note 23, at 2596-98 (discussing how changes in the federal tax law undermine states'
abilities to collect revenue). A state could mitigate revenue reductions without decoupling if
the state legislators increased the state tax rate applicable to the narrowed base, but state tax
rate increases may be undesirable or politically difficult. See Gravelle & Gravelle, supra
note 23, at 641. Of course, if Congress broadens the tax base, the tax base of conforming
states would also broaden, and this would likely increase state tax collections. While this
occurred with the enactment of the 1986 Code, the recent trend has been toward narrowing
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revenue loss will occur without any state legislator action in states that use a
rolling approach to conformity (rather than fixed-date conformity). 46
Revenue losses can be particularly problematic because states generally
operate under balanced budget constraints.47 Given the recent fiscal crises
facing states,48 many states have responded to the adverse revenue effects
of conformity by decoupling from recent federal tax changes, such as
increased bonus depreciation, which would have been quite costly for
states.49
Conforming states can lose more than revenue; they also sacrifice
sovereignty. 50  Increasing conformity means that state legislators
increasingly cede to federal legislators the power to change state tax laws
and control state tax policy.5 1 Thus, "when states adopt the federal tax base
as their own tax base, they deliberately or inadvertently import into their
the federal tax base.
46 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, 7.02.
47 See David Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility
Problem, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 749, 760-65 (2010) (discussing the "informal forces that lead
states to balance their budgets in addition to the formal legal rules that require states to do
so"); see also Robert P. Inman, Transfers and Bailouts: Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline
with Lessons from U.S. Federalism, in FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF
HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINT 35 (Jonathan A. Rodden et al. eds., 2003).
48 Some have argued that state conformity to the federal tax base helped to create state
fiscal crises. William F. Fox, Three Characteristics of Tax Structures Have Contributed to
the Current State Fiscal Crises, 29 ST. TAX NOTEs 375, 380-81 (Aug. 4, 2003).
49 Gravelle & Gravelle, supra note 23, at 642; JOHNSON & SINGHAM, supra note 36
(twenty-two states, including the District of Columbia, have decoupled from Code section
199); MICHAEL MAZEROV, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, OBSCURE TAX PROVISION
OF FEDERAL RECOVERY PACKAGE COULD WIDEN STATE BUDGET GAPS (MAY 19, 2009)
(discussing states that have, and should, decouple from a provision excluding certain
cancellation of debt income from the income tax base); NICHOLAS JOHNSON, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, NEW FEDERAL LAW COULD WORSEN STATE BUDGET
PROBLEMS, STATES CAN PROTECT REVENUES BY "DECOUPLING" (rev. Feb. 28, 2008)
(discussing states that have, and should, decouple from additional federal bonus
depreciation); see also Bertothy & Bertleau, supra note 24; Linda O'Brien, Tax Trends:
States Address Declining Tax Revenues, 83 TAXES 51 (2005); Tower & Boyd, supra note 35
(identifying a long list of Code provisions that states frequently modify).
50 The ability to determine tax policy and the power to raise revenue to finance public
services are central to the concept of state sovereignty. Mazerov & Bucks, supra note 30, at
1472; Joel H. Swift, Fiscal Federalism: Who Controls the States Purse Strings?, 63 TEMP. L.
REv. 251,253-54(1990).
But see Super, supra note 23, at 2646 (suggesting that conformity may actually
increase state autonomy by giving states greater ability to "shape their own revenue policies
[rather] than ... wasting taxpayers' time and their own administrative resources
implementing idiosyncratic definitions of basic concepts").
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own tax system federal regulatory preferences . . . ."52 This runs counter to
the notion of state autonomy 53 and can be detrimental for the state because
state and federal tax policy objectives may not be aligned.54 Further, state
conformity to federal tax law can undermine political accountability by
creating confusion about whether and to what extent state legislators should
be held responsible for the changes in state tax law and/or level of state
.55services.
State tax policy deference to federal tax policy choices may be
particularly problematic with respect to those policy choices that are better
made by more decentralized governmental units.56 Decoupling, rather than
conformity, gives states more ability to use state tax policy to respond
efficiently to the specific economic needs of the state and the state's
taxpayers. 57 Similarly, decoupling may better enable state legislators to
52 Mason, Federalism and the Taxing Power, supra note 24, at 1020; see also Dane,
supra note 44, at 95.
53 Robert M. Kozub, State and Federal Unified Tax Collection: The Piggybacking
Concept, 3 J. ST. TAx'N 195, 210 (1984).
54 This may be the case, for example, because the "[fjederal provision[] [was] intended
to foster national economic policies and [was] not debated in the context of a state income
tax.... [Such a provision] might not promote local economic growth ..... Pomp, supra
note 29, at 1200; see also James P. Angelini & Jerome S. Horvitz, Federal-State Tax Policy
Differentials: Why Piggybacking Will Never Work, 4 J. ST. TAx'N 125, 133-35 (1985)
(discussing ways in which federal and state tax policy goals may compete).
55 For example, state legislators may not get the "political benefits of cutting taxes"
when a new tax expenditure is incorporated into the state tax law as a result of federal
conformity. Nevertheless, state legislators may suffer political stigma if, as a result of such a
tax expenditure, state services are reduced or state tax rates are increased. McLure, supra
note 44, at 569; see also Mason, Delegating Up, supra note 23; Diane M. Ring, What's at
Stake in the Sovereignty Debate?: International Tax and the Nation-State, 49 VA. J. INT'L L.
155, 172-75 (2008) (discussing, in the international context, democratic accountability as an
important norm of sovereignty in taxation).
56 For example, a core insight of the fiscal federalism literature is that redistribution is
better handled through more centralized levels of government. See Kirk J. Stark, Fiscal
Federalism and Tax Progressivity: Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage State and
Local Redistribution?, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 1389, 1408 (2004) (citing RICHARD A. MUSGRAvE
& PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 454-55 (1989);
WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 8 (1972)). So, query whether a state's tax laws
should conform to federal tax provisions that effectuate redistribution through the tax
system, particularly if other states do not conform. See generally Oates, supra note 44;
Shaviro, supra note 32, at 960 (articulating several benefits of state autonomy in taxation);
Super, supra note 23.
57 To the extent that a federal tax provision imposes a nonbenefit tax on mobile
economic units, perhaps this is a provision from which states should decouple; this
decoupling may help the state create a more favorable environment for attracting business,
while leaving to the federal government the responsibility for imposing taxes most
[Vol. 32:527542
Binding Choices
tailor state tax policy to reflect the values and respond to the preferences of
the more localized constituency.5 8
Moreover, from a multi-state perspective, conformity can limit
opportunities for useful tax competition that would help reveal taxpayer
preferences, 59 and conformity constrains the "laboratories of democracy"
from which we can learn about the benefits and costs of different state
approaches (in this case, with respect to taxation).60
B. The Conformity Question for Explicit Elections
Even this simplified overview demonstrates that state policymakers'
decisions about whether, and to what extent, to conform state tax law to
federal tax law require difficult tradeoffs between competing
considerations, including simplicity, administrability, state sovereignty, and
revenue.61 Even the robust literature referenced above is insufficient to
provide guidance to state legislators about how to deal with the conformity
question, however, where the federal tax law provides taxpayers with
explicit elections.
1. What Is Different About Explicit Elections?
With most income tax provisions, state legislators are presented with
one key question - should the state income tax law conform to the federal
income tax law? In general, where a state's tax law conforms to a federal
tax provision, that conformity is generally determinative of the taxpayer's
tax treatment under state tax law. For example, if a state's tax law conforms
to the federal definition of "capital asset," then an asset that is adjudicated
to be a capital asset for federal tax purposes is also a capital asset for state
tax purposes.62
efficiently imposed at a centralized level. See Oates, supra note 44, at 1125; Bird, supra
note 44.
5 Kong, supra note 30; Dane, supra note 44.
59 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory ofLocal Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).
60 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
61 Hellerstein, supra note 30, at 1041 (discussing these tradeoffs); McLure, supra note
23, at 646; Pomp, supra note 29, at 1207. Scholars tend to favor state conformity to federal
tax law, but they acknowledge that states have legitimate reasons to decouple, particularly
from tax expenditure provisions. See, e.g., Kozub, supra note 53 (discussing how greater
conformity could allow simplified tax collection); Shaviro, supra note 32 (arguing for a
more uniform tax base among the states).
62 Taxpayers may take one position on their tax returns, and the tax authority (federal
or state) may challenge that position, successfully or unsuccessfully. The controversy could
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If a state's tax law conforms to a federally provided explicit tax
election, however, that conformity merely means that the state's tax law
provides the same choice as the federal tax law provides. With explicit
elections, state legislators are presented with an additional question - if the
state tax law does conform to the federal tax law (thus, providing a taxpayer
with the same choice for state tax purposes as the taxpayer has for federal
tax purposes), should the taxpayer be obligated to make the same choice for
state tax purposes as the taxpayer makes for federal tax purposes? For
example, if a state's tax law filly conforms to Subchapter S of the Internal
Revenue Code (Code), we still do not know whether a corporation that is an
S corporation for federal tax purposes is also an S corporation for state tax
purposes. In order to know the corporation's state tax classification, we
need to know whether the corporation has elected S status for state tax
purposes.63 Of course, in addition to conforming the state tax law to
Subchapter S of the Code, a state could require that a corporation be
classified the same way for state tax purposes as the corporation is
classified for federal tax purposes, but that is a distinct issue.64
Because the conformity question presented to state legislators is more
complicated in the context of explicit elections, the policy analysis is also
more complicated. This is true even with several simplifying assumptions.
Thus, in order to isolate the policy considerations specifically relevant to
the conformity analysis for explicit elections, the analysis herein generally
makes the following simplifying assumptions, except as otherwise
indicated. First, assume that, other than the particular provision being
discussed, the state income tax regime conforms to the federal income tax
regime in all material respects;65 this assumption will be relaxed as the
discussion proceeds. Second, assume that no issues unique to state taxation
arise from the particular provision;66 this assumption will also be relaxed
be adjudicated, however, and a judge could make a final determination as to whether the
particular asset is a capital asset for federal tax purposes. This is what I mean when I refer to
an adjudication of a substantive issue. Taxpayers are generally precluded from relitigating an
issue at the state level if that issue has been adjudicated at the federal tax level. See infra Part
IV.B.
63 See James Edward Maule, State Taxation of S Corporations, BNA STATE TAX
PORTFOLIOS: BUSINESS ENTITIES AND TRANSACTIONS, 1510-ist, 1510.02 (discussing
different state approaches to the treatment of a corporation that elected S status for federal
purposes).
6 This additional decision is needed regardless of the strength of the state's approach
to conformity.
65 For example, this assumes that the tax consequences of a corporation being
classified as an S corporation are substantially similar for state and federal purposes (i.e., S
corporations are not subject to entity-level tax in the absence of section 1374 built-in gain).
66 For example, consider an S corporation with two shareholders who are residents of
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when the discussion addresses multi-state taxpayers. Third, assume that the
eligibility for, and options available pursuant to, any explicit election are
the same for federal and state tax purposes.67
2. What Are the State Tax Law Alternatives for Elections?
Before moving on to the analysis, it is useful at this point to define a
few basic methods through which a state can implement conformity in the
context of an explicit election. There are a variety of alternatives, but basic
options include the following.
- If the state conforms to the provision of the election and wants to bind
taxpayers to their federal choices, the state law can deem the taxpayer to
make the same choice for state purposes as the taxpayer made for federal
purposes (deemed federal choice). This binds taxpayers automatically,
without requiring state-level taxpayer action. Alternatively, the taxpayer can
be required to make an affirmative state-level choice, but the state law can
bind taxpayers by requiring each taxpayer to make the state tax choice that
is the same as the choice that the taxpayer made for federal purposes
(mandatory matching choice). 69
different U.S. states. A state that allows such an S corporation to exist must determine if and
how the state can collect state taxes on the portion of the S corporation income allocable to
the shareholder who resides out of the state jurisdiction. This question (involving nexus,
apportionment, and allocation issues, among others) is absent at the federal tax level because
both shareholders are residents of the same (U.S.) jurisdiction.
67 For example, consider a married couple's choice to file state tax returns as married
filing jointly or married filing separately. An assumption that the state and federal election
eligibility/options are the same means that the same couples have the same choice under
state and federal law; thus, the state definition of "marriage" is assumed to be the same as the
federal government's definition of "marriage." Of course, this assumption for this election is
not accurate in a number of states.
68 A deemed federal choice can be imposed though the state's choice of conformity
starting point. If the state tax law adopts a federal tax starting point that already incorporates
the choice that the taxpayer made for federal purposes, then taxpayer's federal choice will
already be reflected in the federal tax base to which the state tax law conforms. For example,
if a state uses federal taxable income as the starting point for state tax conformity, that
starting point already reflects the taxpayer's choice as to whether to take the standard
deduction or itemized deductions for federal tax purposes. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32
§§ 5811(21), 5820, 5824 (explaining Vermont's approach to the choice between an itemized
deduction and the standard deduction).
69 Many states take this approach to elections regarding married couples' filing
statuses and regarding itemization of deductions. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:294
(same); N.Y. TAx LAW § 651(b) (generally requiring taxpayers to use the same filing status
for federal and state tax purposes); see also MARTIN, supra note 7, at 4; see GA. CODE ANN.
§ 48-7-27(a) (requiring a taxpayer to make the same state and federal decision about
itemization); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-322(D)(1)(a) (discussing Virginia's requirement that a
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A state need not bind taxpayers to their federal choices. Instead, a state
that conforms to the provision of an election could allow each taxpayer to
make an independent state tax choice, even if it differs from the taxpayer's
federal choice. This can be accomplished by providing a default rule that a
taxpayer is deemed to make the same choice for state purposes as the
taxpayer made for federal purposes, while allowing the taxpayer to opt out
of this default treatment and make a different state tax choice (default
federal choice).70 Alternatively, the taxpayer's state tax choice can be
completely separate, unconstrained in any way by the federal tax choice
(unlinked choice). 71
Of course, a state can choose not to conform and can opt instead to
decouple from the federal tax provision. If the state decouples, the taxpayer
is denied choice for state tax purposes.72 Instead, the state tax law just
provides that a particular set of facts are treated in a particular way, without
regard to what choice is provided (or made) at the federal level.
III. To CONFORM OR NOT TO CONFORM?
The existing literature regarding state conformity to the federal tax
system provides some insight into the question of whether a state should
provide the explicit tax elections that are provided by the federal tax law.
This is particularly true with respect to the issues of state sovereignty and
fiscal federalism. The analyses of many of the policy considerations
relevant to the traditional conformity discussion, such as simplicity,
taxpayer makes the same state and federal decision about itemization).
70 California generally takes this approach to election conformity. See CALIF. REV. &
TAX CODE § 23051.5(e). Pennsylvania recently changed to this approach for S corporation
elections. 2006 Pa. Laws 319 § 307.
n Some states, including Montana, take this approach to the filing status for married
couples. See Memorandum from Dan Dodds, supra note 5, at 1; see also IOWA DEP'T OF
REVENUE, IOWA INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX EXPANDED INSTRUCTIONS at 3 (2010) (Iowa allows
unlinked choice for a married couple's filing status). Also, several states take this approach
to taxpayers' decisions as to whether to itemize deductions. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§
17073, 17073.5; see also OR. REG. STAT. § 316.695(1)(c)(A); DEL. CODE ANN. § 1109. Some
states take a mixed approach to elections, for example, allowing an unlinked choice in some
circumstances but requiring mandatory matching choices in other circumstances. See, e.g.,
N.Y. TAX LAW § 615(a); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, §§ 113.1, 114.1; MD. CODE
ANN. TAX-GEN. §§ 10-217, 10-218 (allowing taxpayers who itemize for federal purposes to
make an independent choice for state purposes as to whether to itemize or take the standard
deduction, but requiring taxpayers who take the standard deduction for federal tax purposes
to make a mandatory matching choice and take the standard deduction for state tax purposes
as well).




administrability, and even revenue, however, are largely indeterminate in
the context of elections without knowing whether the taxpayer's federal
election will be binding on the taxpayer for state tax purposes.
A. Costs & Benefits of Election Conformity, Regardless of Whether an
Election Is Binding73
Reluctance to cede state autonomy could lead state legislators to
consider decoupling from one or more federally provided tax elections. As
with traditional conformity questions, state legislators may be disinclined to
incorporate a federal tax election into state tax law if the tax election
addresses a policy issue that is better addressed at the federal level and/or if
the tax election does not reflect the preferences, values,74 or needs of the
state's taxpayers.75
State legislators may be concerned about ceding state autonomy and
lawmaking power to Congress, particularly with respect to explicit
elections. Tax elections, in general, have been criticized for creating
complexity for taxpayers, increasing administrative burdens on tax
authorities, leading to inequities, and reducing revenue.76 Thus, state
legislators may want to make their own decisions about whether there is
good reason to provide taxpayers with an election, rather than deferring to
Congress's judgment. State policymakers that concur with the critiques may
be loathe to import a federal tax election into the state tax system, thereby
compounding an arguably poor federal tax policy decision to provide an
election at all, and potentially leading to confusion about political
accountability.
In addition, a state that conforms to a federal tax election cedes power
not only to federal legislators but also to taxpayers themselves. An explicit
election, by definition, defers to a taxpayer's choice about how the taxpayer
will be treated for tax purposes; by providing a tax election, the lawmakers
relinquish to the individual taxpayer the power to determine tax
consequences. Thus, a state that conforms to a federal tax election not
The discussion in this section generally assumes relatively strong conformity.
74 For example, the state taxpayers could differ from the nation's taxpayers with
respect to how to treat a married couple for tax purposes and with respect to when and
whether marriage penalties and bonuses are equitable. This will be discussed further in Part
VI.B, infra.
75 These concerns could lead a state to decouple in order to provide tax treatment that
is more favorable for taxpayers (e.g., to try to encourage a particular activity) or that is less
favorable for taxpayers (e.g., to try to raise revenue).
76 See Field, supra note 17, at 26-33 (discussing criticisms of tax elections).
See supra note 17.
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only allows Congress to determine state tax policy, but also allows
Congress to decide when the taxpayers themselves are empowered to
determine the state tax treatment of a particular event. Thus, conformity to
federal tax elections affects not only the balance of power between the state
government and the federal government, but also the balance of power
between the state government and the state taxpayers.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, if state policymakers believe that the
election furthers state interests, conformity to the federal tax election
could be viewed as an exercise (rather than a relinquishment) of state
sovereignty.
B. Costs & Benefits ofElection Conformity That are Largely Indeterminate
Without Knowing Whether an Election is Binding
The above analysis of potential sovereignty and federalism
consequences of state conformity to federal tax elections generally does not
depend on whether a federal tax election is binding on the taxpayer for state
law purposes (assuming such election is provided at the state level). Many
other costs and benefits of conformity discussed in the literature are
indeterminate, however, without knowing whether a taxpayer's federal tax
election will be binding for state tax purposes.79
1. Simplicity
State conformity to a federal tax election advances simplicity in that a
taxpayer only needs to understand one set of tax rules.80 The remainder of
the simplicity analysis, however, depends not only on whether the state
78 Field, supra note 17 (arguing that explicit elections can be useful additions to the tax
system for purposes including "reconciling discontinuous regimes [and] facilitating tax
classification . . . .").
79 Again, this discussion generally assumes relatively strong conformity. As the degree
of conformity weakens, most of the policy benefits described herein are reduced, and most of
the policy costs described herein are increased. See, e.g., infra notes 80-84.
8o When tax elections are added or removed from the federal tax law, taxpayers in
states that use rolling conformity generally recognize this simplicity benefit more than
taxpayers in states that use fixed-date conformity. If an election is incorporated into the
federal tax system after the state's conformity date, then taxpayers will still need to
understand one set of tax rules for federal purposes and a different set of tax rules for state
purposes. Thus, the potential simplicity benefits discussed in this section are much more
relevant where the state uses a rolling conformity approach or where the election is already
part of the federal tax law as it existed as of the state's conformity date. Similarly, the more
state-specific modifications made to the elections, the less simplicity and administrability




conforms to the provision of the tax election, but also on whether the state
requires taxpayers to make the same choice for state purposes as for federal
81purposes.
Consider simplicity of recordkeeping and tax preparation. Even where
a state conforms to a federal election, taxpayers' recordkeeping burdens and
tax preparation costs are not simplified if the taxpayer can make a state tax
choice that differs from the taxpayer's federal choice. Different federal and
state choices likely mean that the taxpayer needs to keep different
federal/state records and that different information is reflected on the
taxpayer's federal/state tax forms. Similarly, the likelihood of taxpayer
mistake is reduced, and the likelihood of taxpayer compliance is increased,
only if the taxpayer's federal tax choice is binding for state tax purposes or
if a taxpayer with an independent choice happens to make the same choice
for both federal and state tax purposes.
Taxpayers' abilities to take tax issues into account when making
business decisions also depend on whether federal elections are binding for
state tax purposes. If a taxpayer can make independent choices, then the
taxpayer must analyze which option better reduces federal income tax and
which option better reduces state income tax. If the taxpayer is required to
make the same federal and state choices, then in addition the taxpayer must
compare the federal and state tax savings/costs in order to determine which
election is tax minimizing, on net. This additional step in the analysis adds
complexity, particularly where a specific choice may reduce the taxpayer's
federal tax burden but may increase the taxpayer's state tax burden (or vice
versa).82 Further, this additional decision-making complexity could
particularly disadvantage less sophisticated taxpayers. 83
2. Administrability & Enforceability
As to conformity's impact on administrability, state conformity to a
federal tax election does ease the administrative burdens on the state
government in that state administrators need not spend time providing state-
8 Taxpayers may make the same choice for federal and state purposes under an
independent choice approach (i.e., where the taxpayer concludes that the choice made for
federal tax purposes also benefits the taxpayer for state tax purposes). The only way for a
state to ensure that a (law-abiding) taxpayer makes the same choice, however, is for the state
to mandate consistency.
82 This result likely requires relaxation of the assumption that the federal and state tax
laws are the same. See supra note 65.
83 Cf Pomp, supra note 29 (cautioning that the additional complexity from decoupling




specific guidance regarding the interpretation and application of the tax
election (e.g., when/how to make the election and who is eligible). Instead,
state administrators can rely on the regulations and guidance issued by the
Treasury and Service and can rely on federal case law that interprets the
statutory language of the federal tax election.
Unless taxpayers make the same choice for state purposes as they make
for federal purposes, however, a state's tax authorities may be limited in
their ability to rely on the Service to assist in the state's enforcement
efforts. In particular, if a taxpayer makes different federal and state choices
pursuant to a tax election available in both regimes, the state tax authorities
gain little benefit from information reporting required by, and their ability
to share information with, the federal tax authorities. 84 Similarly, where
taxpayers can make different federal and state tax elections, states are
limited in their ability to rely on the Service's enforcement capacity; this
limits a state's ability to police both taxpayer eligibility for the tax election
and the substantive tax consequences that result from the election.
3. Revenue
As for revenue, if a state decouples from a federal tax election, the
state's approach to decoupling will generally determine the revenue effects.
If the state decouples and imposes state tax treatment that is less taxpayer-
favorable than the federal tax election, state revenue will increase
(assuming everything else, including the level of economic activity in the
state, remains constant). This decoupling may make the state's business
climate less favorable, however, and the state may lose business and
taxpayers to other states, which could negate the intended revenue effect. If
the state decouples and imposes state tax treatment that is more taxpayer-
favorable than the federal tax election (e.g., to incentivize particular
behavior that the state values), state revenue will decrease (assuming again
84 For example, consider a state that conforms to the entity classification election under
Treasury Regulation § 301.7701-3 (2006), and that allows an entity to be classified, for state
purposes, differently than the entity is classified for federal purposes. See generally Bruce P.
Ely et al., State Tax Treatment of LLCs and LLPs: Update for 2010, J. MULTISTATE TAX &
INCENTIVES, May 2010, at 8. If a multi-member LLC were classified as a partnership for
federal income tax purposes, but the LLC elected to be classified as a corporation for state
income tax purposes, then the partnership tax information reporting and Form K-Is provided
to the LLC's members (as required for federal tax purposes) may have little probative value
for the state tax authority's ability to levy corporate income tax on the entity or to properly
tax the LLC's members (who, for state tax purposes, would be treated as shareholders in a
corporation rather than as partners in a partnership).
85 Again, a rolling conformity approach generally provides these benefits more
effectively than does a fixed-date conformity approach. See supra note 80.
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that everything else, including the level of economic activity in the state,
remains constant). Nevertheless, if the state can use this more taxpayer-
favorable tax treatment to entice more business and investment to the state,
the state might be able to recoup the revenue lost from decoupling.
Where a state chooses to conform to the federal tax election, it can be
difficult to determine whether this conformity increases or reduces a state's
revenue, at least without knowing whether the federal election is binding
for state purposes.86 If a state conforms to the provision of the tax election
and allows taxpayers to make an independent choice for state tax purposes,
state tax revenue will clearly be reduced.87
Where a state conforms to the federal tax election but requires that
taxpayers make the same choice for state purposes as they made for federal
tax purposes, the impact on the state's revenue depends on the alignment
and magnitude of the taxpayer's federal and state tax preferences. Consider
the situation where a state conforms to the provision of a federal tax
election, pursuant to which the taxpayer can elect Option A or Option B. If
a taxpayer's federal and state tax preferences are aligned (i.e., where the
taxpayer prefers to elect Option A because Option A minimizes the
taxpayer's federal and state tax burdens), then a state's conformity to a
federal election is revenue reducing for the state.88
If a taxpayer's federal and state tax preferences are not aligned (i.e.,
Option A minimizes the taxpayer's federal tax burden, but Option B
minimizes the taxpayer's state tax burden),89 however, each rational
taxpayer will make the election that best reduces the taxpayer's net tax
burden. As a result, a binding election's impact on the state's revenue
86 Except where explicitly stated, this discussion does not take into account any
dynamic revenue effects that could arise as a result of a state's decisions about whether to
provide the election or about whether to bind taxpayers to their federal choices.
87 This assumes rational taxpayers who measure utility in dollars. With unconstrained
state tax elections, the rational taxpayer would make the tax-minimizing choice, which
reduces state tax revenue. However, not all taxpayers make tax-minimizing choices, for
example, because of mistake or because of an important personal reason (such as a married
couple's desire to keep each spouse's finances separate). See COLES, supra note 7, at 14
(noting that the Montana Department of Revenue identified more than 2500 married couples
who may have paid more state tax because they filed separately rather than jointly).
88 Generally, if the state tax regime conforms to the federal tax regime in all material
respects, as assumed under the first simplifying assumption, taxpayers' federal and state tax
election preferences should virtually always be aligned. See supra note 65.
89 This is most likely to occur when we relax the first simplifying assumption, such
that the state tax consequences of a particular election choice can differ from the federal tax
consequences of the same election choice. See supra note 65; see also infra Parts VIA.1.,




depends primarily on the magnitude of the federal and state tax costs and
benefits of each choice available pursuant to the election. Generally, if a
particular binding choice (Option A) reduces a taxpayer's federal tax
burden more than that choice increases the taxpayer's state tax burden, then
the taxpayer will make that choice (Option A), thereby increasing state
revenue. By requiring a binding choice in these situations, the state
effectively claims part of the monetary value of the tax election that
Congress provided to the taxpayers, denying to the state taxpayers the full
federal tax value of the election.90 In the likely less common circumstances
where a binding choice (Option B) reduces the taxpayer's state tax burden
more than that choice increases the taxpayer's federal tax burden, the
taxpayer will generally choose to pay higher federal taxes in order to save a
greater amount of state taxes (i.e., the taxpayer will choose Option B).
Requiring a binding choice in this context causes the state's taxpayers to
pay more total tax than the taxpayers would pay if the state had allowed the
taxpayers to make independent choices. However, the federal fisc, rather
than the state's fisc, would reap the benefit of this increased tax payment.
4. Multi-State Implications
The foregoing discussion focuses primarily on the implications for
each individual state and its single-state taxpayers of conforming (or not
conforming) to federal tax elections. Each state's approach to election
conformity, however, can have broader implications, affecting other states
and taxpayers in other states. This is particularly true when taxpayers pay
income tax in multiple states. Thus, when considering tax elections that
taxpayers are likely to face in multiple states, state legislators should be
wary of making state-level election conformity decisions that create
significant externalities, lest they lead to federal intervention or cooperative
multi-state coordination efforts.
Whether a state's approach to tax election conformity creates
externalities can depend on whether the state binds its taxpayers to their
federal tax elections. For example, consider a multi-state taxpayer facing a
tax election that is available in the several states in which the taxpayer pays
tax. If the multiple states allow independent elections, each of which results
in non-facial conformity, each such state magnifies the record-keeping
burden of multi-state taxpayers and the administration difficulties of the
multiple jurisdictions. The multi-state implications are exacerbated upon
90 In this situation, taxpayers in states that require a binding election will receive a
smaller net monetary benefit as a result of the federal and state tax elections, as compared to
the monetary benefit that taxpayers in states that do not require binding elections will receive
as a result of their federal tax elections.
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relaxation of the assumption that the states' underlying tax laws are the
same (the first simplifying assumption)91 and relaxation of the assumption
that no issues unique to state taxation arise from the provision (the second
simplifying assumption).92
Where the relevant state tax laws differ, binding taxpayers to their
federal tax elections for state tax purposes could result in the imposition of
taxes by multiple states on the same income (where the tax bases overlap
and the methods for alleviating double taxation are insufficient). 93 Binding
elections could also enable a state to try to export taxes to nonresidents,
who may be willing to suffer increased taxation by the particular state in
order to reduce taxation imposed by the federal government and the
taxpayer's home state.94
Conversely, where the relevant state tax laws differ and where states
opt not to bind taxpayers to their federal tax elections, compliance
complexity could be particularly problematic. This type of multi-state
compliance complexity led to the Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP),
which is a collective effort by many states to make the states' sales taxes
more uniform in order to increase simplicity and administrability.95
Additionally, the possibility that a taxpayer could make inconsistent tax
choices in different states provides the taxpayer with opportunities for tax
planning, which could enable the taxpayer to avoid full taxation at the state
level. This could lead to tax competition: states may compete by offering
various tax incentives, and individual taxpayers could make the elections
that enable them to avail themselves of multiple tax incentives in different
91 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
92 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
9 See, e.g., Crawford & Uzes, supra note 21, l 140.06B(7) (explaining that a section
338(h)(10) election can affect a state's apportionment formula); Bobby L. Burgner, Income
Taxes: Special Problems in Formulary Apportionment, BNA STATE TAX PORTFOLIOS:
CORPORATE INCOME TAXEs, 1180-3rd, T1 180.05D (explaining that different states can have
different methods of formulary apportionment, which can lead to multiple taxation at the
state level).
94 As with the analysis of the revenue implications of binding federal and state tax
elections, rational taxpayers will, when faced with a binding election, make the choice that
minimizes net taxes. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89. As a result, a nonresident
taxpayer might make the election that causes it to pay slightly higher taxes in one state,
while enabling it to pay much lower taxes in the taxpayer's home state.
9 See Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement § 102 (as amended through Apr. 30,
2010), available at http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/uploads/downloads/
Archive/SSUTA/SSUTAAsAmended_4_30 10.pdf (explaining that the purpose of the
SSTP is "to simplify ... sales and use tax administration ... [thereby] substantially
reduc[ing] the burden of compliance" by increasing "[u]niformity in the state and local tax
bases," "[u]niformity of major tax base definitions," and "[u]niform[ity ofj sourcing rules for
all taxable transactions," among other approaches).
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jurisdictions, some of which would be unavailable if the taxpayer was
required to make consistent elections for all jurisdictions. Such tax
competition may be productive or destructive depending on the
circumstances. 96
IV. TAXPAYER CONSISTENCY
The above discussion explains that the costs and benefits of state
conformity to a federal tax election can depend, in large part, on whether
the taxpayer's federal choice will be binding on the taxpayer for state tax
purposes. Thus, any state considering conformity to a federal tax election
should consider whether and how to bind a taxpayer, for state tax purposes,
to the election that the taxpayer made for federal tax purposes.
Before directly confronting those questions (to which I will turn in Part
V), this part discusses the concept of taxpayer consistency in circumstances
that, through analogy, might provide additional insight into whether and
when a taxpayer consistency requirement is appropriate in the state/federal
tax election context. Specifically, this part considers how authorities and
literature regarding (a) taxpayer consistency in the context of tax elections
at the federal level, (b) taxpayer consistency in non-elective contexts where
state tax law conforms to federal tax law, and (c) broad judicial doctrines
regarding taxpayer consistency, can help to answer the question of whether
and when taxpayers' federal tax elections should be binding for state tax
purposes.
A. Taxpayer Consistency in Elective Contexts at the Federal Level 97
Query how a taxpayer's choice of tax treatment for purposes of one tax
96 See generally Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce
Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REv. 377, 382-405
(1996) (analyzing the causes and effects of interstate tax competition).
97 The examples discussed herein focus on election consistency questions involving a
single taxpayer. That is, query whether Taxpayer T should be allowed to elect Option A for
one purpose and Option B for another. Election consistency questions also arise in multi-
taxpayer contexts. That is, query whether Taxpayer T and Taxpayer U must both elect
Option A for a single set of facts involving both taxpayers, or whether one of the taxpayers
can elect Option B. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 71, 215 (consistency with respect to elective
treatment of alimony); I.R.C. § 108(i); Rev. Proc. 2009-37, 2009-36 I.R.B. 1; T.D. 9498,
2010-45 C.B. (essentially enabling individual partners to make different elections regarding
whether to defer the recognition of partnership cancellation of indebtedness income).
Inconsistency in the multi-taxpayer context poses the risk that a single tax authority could be
whipsawed, though this concern does not arise in the same way in the single taxpayer




regime should affect the taxpayer's treatment for purposes of another tax
regime, or vice versa. This part examines two circumstances where this
question is faced. Each involves two distinct tax regimes, where a particular
federal tax election is available in one or both regimes.
1. Elective Classification of Foreign Entities
Entity classification for foreign entities is one circumstance in which a
tax election can result in an entity being treated differently for two different
tax regimes. Under the "check-the-box" regulations, a foreign eligible entity
can elect whether it will be treated as a corporation or pass-through98 for
United States tax purposes.99 As a result of this U.S. federal tax election, a
foreign entity can be treated differently for U.S. and foreign tax purposes (a
"hybrid entity"). Commentators have criticized this elective entity
classification regime for foreign entities because, among other reasons,
hybrid entities provide opportunities for cross-border tax arbitrage.100
Specifically, there are several ways that a U.S. taxpayer can use a hybrid
entity to "fully compl[y] with the laws of both the United States and the
foreign country, but . .. generate[] a net worldwide tax benefit solely due to
the inconsistent treatment of the subsidiary by the two jurisdictions."o10
In response to the revenue and other policy problems created by these
arbitrage opportunities,102 commentators recommend revising the entity
98 If the entity has multiple members, it can elect between corporate treatment and
partnership treatment. If the entity has a single member, it can elect between corporate
treatment and treatment as a disregarded entity. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (2006).
99 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, -3. (2012). The extension of elective entity classification
to foreign entities was subject to considerable debate. See Heather M. Field, Checking In on
"Check-the-Box, " 42 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 451, notes 190-197 and accompanying text (2009)
(discussing the debate).
1oo See, e.g., Mitchell A. Kane, Strategy and Cooperation in National Responses to
International Tax Arbitrage, 53 EMORY L.J. 89, 160-65 (2004); Diane M. Ring, One Nation
Among Many: Policy Implications of Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage, 44 B.C. L. REv. 79, 96-
100 (2002) (describing examples of arbitrage opportunities available using hybrid entities);
see also, e.g., Adam H. Rosenzweig, Harnessing the Costs of International Tax Arbitrage,
26 VA. TAX REv. 555, 565-68 (2007) (explaining that "tax arbitrage" differs from traditional
economic arbitrage because, among other things, "there is no market-based price correction
for international tax arbitrage"); Daniel N. Shaviro, More Revenues, Less Distortion?
Responding to Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 113, 122-27 (2004)
(noting that these "tax arbitrages" are not actually arbitrages, although they are "in the
metaphorical sense of exploiting inconsistencies in the application of a shared legal
concept").
101 Rosenzweig, supra note 100, at 562-63 (explaining the tax arbitrage objective).
102 See, e.g., id. at 564-65; Ring, supra note 100, at 117-24 (discussing adverse policy
consequences of arbitrage with hybrid entities).
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classification rules for foreign entities. 103 Among a variety of suggested
approaches, some commentators have argued that the United States should
"classify a foreign business entity as a corporation if the entity is subject to
an entity-level income tax (under U.S. foreign tax credit principles) under
the law of its country of tax residence . 104 This approach would align
the U.S. tax classification of the entity with the foreign tax classification of
the entity, thereby eliminating discrepancies in entity classification that
taxpayers can exploit.105
The ability to make independent elections for state and federal tax
purposes presents a tax arbitrage opportunity similar to the arbitrage
opportunity presented by the elective classification of foreign entities. 106
Specifically, where there is an economic incentive for a taxpayer to make
different state and federal elections, the taxpayer could generate a tax
benefit merely by making inconsistent elections for the different
jurisdictions, opting to apply one set of tax rules to the facts for federal tax
purposes and opting to apply a different set of tax rules to the same facts for
state tax purposes. In the context of explicit tax elections, this opportunity
will generally only arise where the state tax consequences that will apply as
a result of a particular election choice differ materially from the federal tax
consequences that will apply as a result of the same election choice (i.e.,
103 See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE
TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES (Comm. Print 2005) (recommending that
single member foreign eligible entities be treated as corporations for U.S. tax purposes).
104 ABA, Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform, 59 TAX LAW. 649, 669
(2006).
105 This proposal is both about increasing consistency of treatment and limiting
taxpayer electivity, which are related, but slightly different, concerns. Id. at 736-55.
106 As with "arbitrage" with hybrid entities, the "arbitrage" opportunities that arise from
independent elections are not traditional economic arbitrages. See supra note 100. For the
purposes of this discussion, however, I will use the term tax arbitrage broadly to "describe
transactions that involve tax advantages, but no other financial consequences, for the
taxpayer." Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 107
HARv. L. REV. 460, 471 (1993); see also MYRON S. SCHOLES, ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS
STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH T 5.6 (3d ed. 2005); Ring, supra note 100, at 82 (defining
arbitrage as the "exploitation of differences between the tax systems of two different
jurisdictions to minimize the taxes paid to either or both") (quoting Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
Commentary on Tillinghast Lecture, 53 TAX L. REV. 167, 167 (2000)). This broad
"arbitrage" concept is consistent with the concept of "tax arbitrage" as used in the cross-
border context. See supra note 100. Explicit tax elections, by definition, involve tax
consequences, but no other financial or economic consequences. Thus, the ability to make
opposing elections in different jurisdictions for the same facts, thereby reducing the




where the state and federal tax rules are asymmetric).lo7 For example, a
married couple may have an incentive to make opposite elections if the
couple can minimize its federal tax burden by filing jointly, but the couple
can minimize its state tax burden by filing separately.108
To the extent that state legislators believe that independent state
elections pose problematic arbitrage opportunities (and it is not clear that
they necessarily do), there are a variety of potential responses. For example,
state legislators could respond unilaterally to this state/federal arbitrage
opportunity in the same way that some commentators have urged the
federal government to respond unilaterally to the federal/foreign arbitrage
opportunity presented by hybrid entities - require consistency between the
tax treatment in the former jurisdiction and the tax treatment in the latter
jurisdiction.109
There are several differences between the federal/foreign hybrid entity
context and the state/federal election context, so appropriate responses (if
needed) to the situations are not necessarily the same. For example, one
important difference is that, in the state/federal election context, one
jurisdiction is contained entirely within the other jurisdiction, whereas, in
the federal/foreign hybrid entity context, the jurisdictions do not overlap.
This matters because part of the tax arbitrage concern with hybrid entities is
that taxpayers can exploit the differences in the tax laws of two different
jurisdictions to reduce the taxpayer's aggregate tax burden in those two
jurisdictions, as compared to the tax burden that the taxpayer would have
borne had the taxpayer invested entirely in only one of the jurisdictions.1 10
That is, the taxpayer opts to invest in two jurisdictions in order to achieve a
tax advantage that would have been unavailable if the taxpayer had invested
in only one jurisdiction. This is only possible in circumstances where the
taxing jurisdictions are non-overlapping sovereigns (in that, a taxpayer who
invests in the United States does not necessarily also invest in a foreign
jurisdiction). In contrast, the state tax jurisdiction is wholly included in the
107 This requires the relaxation of the assumption that the operative federal and state tax
rules are substantially similar in all material respects.
108 See infra Part VI.B.1. Some states, like Delaware and Montana, include language,
in bold font, in their tax return instruction booklets explicitly drawing the attention of
taxpayers to this opportunity to reduce state taxes by making different filing choices for state
purposes than they made for federal purposes.
109 This assumes, in the state/federal election context, that the state legislators act
unilaterally in response to federal tax laws that remain unchanged, and in the federal/foreign
hybrid entity context, that the federal legislators act unilaterally in response to foreign tax
laws that remain unchanged. The policy response need not be unilateral in either situation,
but it is likely to be easier for one jurisdiction to take unilateral action to combat a perceived
abuse rather than to negotiate joint action with another jurisdiction.
no See Shaviro, supra note 100, at 116.
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federal tax jurisdiction; this subsidiarity means that, by investing in a state,
a taxpayer must also be investing in the United States. Thus, the arbitrage
opportunity in the state/federal election context, where a taxpayer lacks the
ability to invest in the smaller jurisdiction without simultaneously investing
in the larger jurisdiction, does not pose the same risk of opportunistic
behavior as does the arbitrage opportunity in the federal/foreign hybrid
entity context, where a taxpayer can freely invest in one jurisdiction without
investing in the other jurisdiction.
Another important difference between the federal/foreign hybrid entity
context and the state/federal election context involves whether an election is
allowed in only one, or both, of the relevant jurisdictions. Specifically, the
consistency analysis for the entity classification election involves multiple
tax regimes, but only one of those regimes generally provides a tax election.
This treats the foreign tax treatment as a given, presenting the question of
whether to make the U.S. federal tax classification mandatory (rather than
elective) as well. The state/federal election question involves multiple tax
regimes, however, both of which provide elections. This raises a slightly
different question, asking whether to make the state tax treatment
mandatorily the same as the federal tax treatment that remains elective.
2. Explicit Elections in the Alternative Minimum Tax
For purposes of analyzing the state/federal election consistency
question, it is also helpful to discuss the consistency obligations for
elections in the regular federal income tax and the federal alternative
minimum tax (AMT), as this is a context in which both tax regimes provide
elections. Here, the question is whether an election that a taxpayer makes
for regular tax purposes is, and should be, binding on that taxpayer for
AMT purposes too.
The Service generally takes the position that a taxpayer's regular
income tax elections are binding on the taxpayer for purposes of the
alternative minimum tax.I11 Professor Daniel Lathrope has criticized this
position as inconsistent with the Service's "position that the AMT is a
separate and independent income tax."ll2 He argues that "if the AMT is
In Rev. Rul. 87-44, 1987-1 C.B. 3 (election made for regular income tax purposes
regarding the carryback of net operating losses (NOLs) applies for AMT purposes); see also
Marx v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2003-23, 2003 WL 1359267 (2003) (ruling that a
taxpayer's election to take the standard deduction for purposes of the regular tax precluded
the taxpayer from itemizing for AMT purposes).
112 DANIEL J. LATHROPE, ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAx 1 2.01[2] (2009) (citing the
General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 for the proposition that "[flor most
purposes, the tax base for the new alternative minimum tax is determined as though the
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truly separate and independent from the regular tax, a taxpayer should be
able to make a tax election for AMT purposes independent of the election
made for regular purposes"ll 3 and he suggests that "Regulation [section]
1.55-1(a) appears to permit a taxpayer to make inconsistent regular tax and
AMT elections [except in specifically articulated circumstances]."ll4
Professor Lathrope cautions, however, that "until the [Service] indicates
whether it will treat the AMT as completely separate from the regular tax,
the success of a separate AMT election cannot be assured."
The federal tax and a state's tax are arguably even more "separate and
independent" than are the regular federal tax and the federal AMT,116 given
that the regular federal income tax and the federal AMT are levied by the
same taxing jurisdiction, whereas the federal income tax and a state income
tax are regimes levied by different jurisdictions. The more important it is to
a state's policymakers that the state's tax regime is considered to be
separate and independent from the federal tax regime, the stronger the
argument may be that the state should allow independent elections.
B. Taxpayer Consistency in Nonelective Contexts Where State Tax Law
Conforms to Federal Tax Law
The issue of tax consistency also arises in nonelective contexts. In
particular, there is case law regarding how a taxpayer's federal tax
treatment can affect the taxpayer's tax treatment in a conforming state.
States vary somewhat, but the case law has been summarized as follows:
When a matter of federal income tax liability is disputed but
ultimately resolved at the federal level, the question often arises as
to the impact of the resolution of the federal dispute on the
taxpayer's state tax liability. For example, courts addressing the
same question under the personal income tax have held that (1)
issues litigated at the federal level are binding for state tax
purposes; (2) issues settled at the federal level are sometimes, but
not always, controlling for state tax purposes; and items merely
alternative minimum tax were a separate and independent income tax system" (emphasis
omitted)).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 3.02[4] (specifically calling out the NOL carryback election as binding);
Treas. Reg. § 1.55-1(a) (1994).
1 LATHROPE, supra note 112, at 3.02.
116 Query to what extent this depends on the state's approach to conformity. For
example, is a state's tax system more separate and more independent of the federal tax
system if the state actually enacts statutory language that happens to match the relevant Code
provision, as compared to a state that merely incorporates federal tax law by reference?
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reported for federal purposes are not binding for state tax
117
purposes.
The final federal-level adjudication of a tax issue is binding for
purposes of taxes imposed by a state that conforms with respect to that tax
issue because the federal- and state-level provisions "are sufficiently
identical to warrant an estoppel."118 This rationale for treating a federal-
level adjudication as binding for state-level taxes assumes that there is a
"correct" definition of a particular term. Where the federal and state tax
terms are "sufficiently identical," a final federal-level adjudication of the
"correct" substantive answer should also provide the "correct" substantive
answer for state-level tax purposes.119
117 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, 7.02[4][c] (citations omitted),
20.02[1] (discussing some of the caselaw in more detail).
118 Calhoun v. Franchise Tax Bd., 574 P.2d 763, 765 (Cal. 1978).
Some arguments in favor of increased book/tax conformity reflect a similar concept,
i.e., that book income and tax income ought to be the same, or at least that the divergence of
book income and tax income likely reflects manipulation or abuse, rather than just
differences in the applicable regulatory regimes. See generally STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO CORPORATE
TAX REFORM: ISSUES OF CONFORMING BOOK AND TAX INCOME AND CAPITAL COST RECOVERY
2, 11-19 (Comm. Print 2006); Daniel Shaviro, The Optimal Relationship Between Taxable
Income and Financial Accounting Income: Analysis and a Proposal (NYU Ctr. for Law,
Econ., & Org. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 07-38), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1017073. Analogies to the book/tax conformity debate, however,
may be less helpful for our purposes than other analogies discussed herein because the book
and tax systems generally differ more than tax systems in two different jurisdictions. In
particular, book and tax differ in that (a) taxpayers generally have opposite goals - to
minimize income for tax purposes and to maximize income for book purposes - and (b) the
regimes reflect different fundamental principles that are tailored toward the different users
(and uses) of the information provided - the tax system seeks "to measure income for the
purpose of levying the income tax. ... [and] favors objectivity, administrability, and
consistency among taxpayers," whereas the "primary purpose of financial reporting is to
provide information about a company to investors and creditors" and as a result, the book
system "values accuracy and conservatism." STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
109TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO CORPORATE TAX REFORM:
ISSUES OF CONFORMING BOOK AND TAX INCOME AND CAPITAL COST RECOVERY 15 (Comm.
Print 2006) (citation omitted). Because of these differing incentives and underlying
principles, proponents of book/tax conformity argue that each regime can be used as an
effective limit on aggressive behavior in both regimes; that is, when forced to use a single
number that balances aggressive tendencies that point in opposite directions, that
compromise number is likely to be more "correct" than either of the more aggressive
numbers. In contrast, taxpayers subject to multiple tax jurisdictions generally have a single
goal - to minimize the aggregate tax paid to the multiple jurisdictions - and the different
tax regimes generally share the goal of measuring (and taxing) income in an objective,
administrable, and fair way. Taxpayers may employ different methods to minimize tax in the
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In contrast, with explicit elections, there are multiple possible
alternative treatments of the same tax issue, and by definition, all
alternatives comply with the law. No alternative is more or less
substantively "correct," under the existing tax law. 120 Thus, the argument,
in the nonelective context, that federal tax determinations ought to be
binding for conforming state tax law purposes is largely unpersuasive in the
elective context. If neither option provided pursuant to a federal election is
the "correct" or "incorrect" substantive tax treatment, then similarly, neither
option provided by the state election should be substantively "correct" or
"incorrect," so there is little (if any) substantive accuracy to be gained by
mandating that taxpayers use their federal-level approach for state tax-level
as well.
It could be argued that a taxpayer, by making the election at one level
of government, is actually selecting the taxpayer's preferred "correct"
substantive tax treatment, and that the taxpayer should use that "correct"
answer (once chosen) in all other circumstances. This gets to a fundamental
question about the nature of an explicit tax election - is there substance to
a tax election or is a tax election mere form? That is, is a tax election a
taxpayer's statement that establishes "facts" and identifies the "truth of the
matter," or is a tax election merely the taxpayer's identification of how tax
will be computed?
Tax elections serve a variety of purposes, including "reconciling
discontinuous regimes, facilitating tax classification, promoting simplicity
and administrability, and condoning tax planning."1 21 Generally, these tax
elections, particularly accounting elections, "drastically affect tax liabilities
without altering taxpayers' relations with the outside world;" they "are
matters of form rather than substance" that affect the calculation of tax but
otherwise have "no nontax ramifications."1 22 Thus, unless a tax election is
jurisdictions, and tax jurisdictions may employ different methods to measure income
appropriately, but there is less benefit in trying to use one regime to curtail abuses in the
other, given the general alignment of state/federal taxpayer incentives and of state/federal tax
authority goals.
120 One might argue that the provision of the election is bad tax policy, and that the
"correct" approach to the particular tax issue would be to mandatorily treat the tax issue in a
particular way. That is a normative, rather than descriptive, assessment. If one election
alternative is more "correct" (e.g., consistent with the Haig-Simons definition of income), it
may be preferable for a state to decouple from the election and mandate a particular tax
treatment. As long as an election is provided, however, any option afforded pursuant to the
election complies with the law.
121 Field, supra note 17, at 34.
122 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES &
GIFTS 1 4.3.3 (2011). Similarly, where, for example, an election (such as a section 338
election) is used to reconcile discontinuous regimes, the underlying substance of the
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understood to imbue a situation with substance that is meaningful for
purposes beyond federal tax law,123 the authorities regarding federal/state
consistency in the nonelective context may not be particularly probative in
the elective context.
C. Judicial Doctrines Regarding Taxpayer Consistency
Concerns about taxpayer consistency arise in a wide variety of
additional contexts. In response, courts have developed doctrines that
constrain taxpayer choices and curtail abuse. These doctrines include the
doctrine of election, the taxpayer's duty of consistency, and the non-
disavowal principle.
1. The Doctrine of Election
The doctrine of election generally provides that a taxpayer should be
bound to the taxpayer's initial choice between alternative tax treatments. 124
transaction is quite clear. A section 338 election helps to alleviate the stark tax difference
between structuring an acquisition as a stock purchase rather than an asset purchase, but
there is no ambiguity about the substance of the transaction. The substance of the transaction
is clearly a stock purchase and not an asset purchase, and the election does not change that.
Rather, the election merely changes the way in which the tax is computed. Thus, such a
federal tax election is likely to have little, if any, probative value for purposes of determining
the substantively correct state tax treatment.
123 It is possible, for example, that a "classification" election, such as the entity
classification election, may be understood to imbue the particular situation with some degree
of substance. Elections that facilitate classification are generally useful when substantive
classification tests "cease to be meaningful" - that is, where there is some difficulty in
determining the truth of the matter. Field, supra note 17, at 46-50. The entity classification
election provided by Treasury Regulation section 301.7701-3, in part, responds to the
difficulty of substantively distinguishing corporations from partnerships. IRS Notice 95-14,
1995-14 I.R.B. 7 (explaining the Service's rationale for changing from a substantive
classification system to an elective classification system). In light of this substantive
ambiguity, the taxpayer's entity classification election could be conceived of as tantamount
to the taxpayer's identification of the true "substance" of the nature of the entity. That
"substance" identified by the federal tax election could be meaningful, at least to some
degree, for purposes of determining the proper state tax treatment. Nevertheless, a
classification election need not be understood this way. A classification election could, like
many other elections, be understood as a formal tool for determining how to calculate tax in
a particular situation, where there may otherwise be multiple possible reasonable ways to
calculate tax. For example, an entity classification election does not affect the entity's
treatment for nontax purposes; an entity that is a general partnership under state law remains
a general partnership for nontax purposes, even if it elects to be treated as a corporation for
federal income tax purposes. Thus, query whether such a federal classification election really
creates "substance" that ought to be meaningful for state tax purposes.




The doctrine of election, as it applies to Federal tax law, consists
of two elements: (i) a free choice between two or more
alternatives, and (ii) an overt act by the taxpayer communicating
the choice to the Commissioner; i.e., a manifestation of choice. A
taxpayer who makes such an election may not, without the consent
of the Commissioner, retroactively revoke or amend it merely
because another alternative now appears to be more
advantageous.125
Despite the long history of this doctrine,126 it is not always clear how
(and the extent to which) the doctrine applies. For example, in 2002, the
Service changed its litigation position on the doctrine of election, at least in
a limited context; the Service "will no longer argue that the doctrine of
election applies to preclude a taxpayer from amending past years' returns to
elect retroactively to value assets according to their fair market values for
purposes of apportioning interest expense under Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-
9T(g)."l27 Further, two commentators have argued that, in general, the
"doctrine of election should no longer be a part of tax jurisprudence ...
[because] the doctrine of election may lack a valid legal foundation and
may also be contrary to congressional intent ... [and because] the doctrine
of election creates inequities and ambiguities in tax jurisprudence."
128
Even assuming that the doctrine of election remains in full force, it
fails to address the question of whether a taxpayer should make consistent
federal and state tax elections.129 The doctrine of election is intended to
limit a taxpayer, who has the benefit of hindsight, from changing a choice
after the choice is made, thereby undoing an agreement that the taxpayer
had with the particular tax authority. In contrast, if a taxpayer wishes to
Beth Stetson, The Doctrine ofElection, 62 TAX LAW. 335 (2009).
125 IRS Tech. Adv. Mem. 2002-59-059 (Sept. 10, 2002); see also Helvey & Stetson,
supra note 124; Edward Yorio, The Revocability of Federal Tax Elections, 44 FORDHAM L.
REv. 463 (1975) (considering when and if a taxpayer should be able to reverse a prior
elective choice).
126 Helvey & Stetson, supra note 124, at 340-42 (tracing the development of the
doctrine of election).
127 IRS Chief Counsel Notice 2002-027 (June 6, 2002).
128 Helvey & Stetson, supra note 124, at 336.
129 In addition, this assumes that the federal doctrine of election is applicable in the
state context. See Giles Sutton et al., MTC Three-Factor Election in California, Michigan,
and Texas, 56 ST. TAX NOTES 863, n.24 (June 14, 2010) ("It is uncertain whether, or to what




make a state election that differs from the taxpayer's federal tax election,
the taxpayer is not attempting to retroactively change its federal choice or
alter its taxing arrangement with the federal tax authority. That federal
choice, once made, determines the taxpayer's federal tax treatment; by
making a contemporaneous, but different state tax choice, the taxpayer
seeks to affect its state tax consequences, not its federal tax consequences.
The taxpayer's chosen taxing arrangement with each jurisdiction is
unchanged by the taxpayer's separate agreement with the other jurisdiction.
Thus, the doctrine of election, which is intended to constrain a taxpayer's
ability to retroactively change choices with respect to the taxpayer's
treatment under a single tax regime, should be largely inapplicable to the
state/federal election conformity question. 130
2. The Taxpayer's Duty of Consistency
An analogy to the taxpayer's "duty of consistency" is similarly inapt.
"The duty of consistency is based on the theory that the taxpayer owes the
Commissioner the duty to be consistent in the tax treatment of items and
will not be permitted to benefit from the taxpayer's own prior error or
omission."l31 This limits a taxpayer's ability to change positions vis-a-vis
the Service (a single tax authority) after the statute of limitations has closed
with respect to the first instance of that position (i.e., over several tax
periods). In contrast, the federal/state election conformity question
discussed herein involves multiple taxing authorities in a single tax period.
As with the doctrine of election,132 a taxpayer who makes one election for
federal tax purposes is not attempting to change that federal tax election by
making a different election for state tax purposes; thus, by making different
federal and state tax elections, the taxpayer does not violate any duty of
consistency vis-a-vis either tax authority. Thus, the taxpayer's duty of
consistency is of little help in answering the state/federal election
conformity question.
130 Said differently, the doctrine of election requires consistency of choice within a
single tax regime, while the state/federal election consistency question presented in this
article asks whether to require that a choice in one regime is consistent with a choice made in
another regime. These are different questions as long as the federal and state governments
are respected as separate and distinct regimes.
131 Cluck v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 324, 331 (1995); see BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra
note 122, 4.3.7; Steve R. Johnson, The Taxpayer's Duty of Consistency, 46 TAx L. REV.
537 (1991). The tax benefit rule is closely related to the taxpayer's duty of consistency in
that the tax benefit rule requires that a taxpayer behave consistently over a period of years
(e.g., by including in income amounts recovered that the taxpayer had previously deducted
as bad debts). See generally BITrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 122, 5.7.
132 See supra Part IV.C.I.
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3. The Danielson Rule & the Non-Disavowal Principle
The Danielson rule and the broader "non-disavowal principle" also fail
to provide much guidance about whether a taxpayer who makes one
election for federal tax purposes should be allowed to make a different
election for state tax purposes. As articulated by the Third Circuit in
Commissioner v. Danielson, "a party can challenge the tax consequences of
his agreement as construed by the Commissioner only ... because of
mistake, undue influence, fraud, duress, etc." That is, taxpayers are
generally bound, for tax purposes, by the terms of the contracts into which
they enter.134 More broadly, the "non-disavowal principle" suggests that a
taxpayer should be bound by the form that the taxpayer has chosen for its
actions. 135
Neither of these principles is absolute,136 but even accepting them, they
seem unlikely to preclude a taxpayer from making inconsistent elections for
federal and state purposes on the grounds that one such election is an
impermissible disavowal of the position taken by the taxpayer pursuant to
the other election. Treating a tax election as an agreement between the
taxpayer and the relevant taxing jurisdiction,137 a different election made in
a different taxing jurisdiction is not a rejection of the first agreement. It
remains the case that, for purposes of the first jurisdiction, tax will be
calculated as agreed; neither jurisdiction is put at risk for whipsaw (one of
the concerns that motivated the court in Danielson),138 and neither taxing
authority has the potential to be "faced with conflicting claims" as a result
of the inconsistent positions.139 Even the Service has conceded that it is
consistent with the Danielson rule for a tax issue created by the terms of a
133 Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d Cir. 1967).
134 Cf IRS Field Serv. Adv. 2000-04-009 (Jan. 28, 2000) (articulating and applying the
Danielson rule).
135 See Commissioner v. Nat'l Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134, 149
(1974) ("a taxpayer is free to organize his affairs as he chooses, ... [but then] he must accept
the tax consequences of his choice . . . ."); Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477 (1940) ("[a]
taxpayer is free to adopt such organization for his affairs as he may choose and having [made
that choice], he must accept the tax disadvantages."); see generally BITTKER & LOKKEN,
supra note 122, 4.3.6.
136 See generally Bittker & Lokken, supra note 122, 4.3.6.
1 See Field, supra note 17, at 67; see also supra note 96 (distinguishing between
single taxpayer elections, where any agreement is between the taxpayer and the government,
and multi-taxpayer elections, where there may also be an agreement between the private
parties).
138 Danielson, 378 F.2d. at 775; see also Michael E. Baillif, The Return Consistency
Rule: A Proposal for Resolving the Substance-Form Debate, 48 TAX LAw. 289,309 (1995).
139 Comdisco, Inc. v. United States, 756 F.2d 569, 577-78 (7th Cir. 1985).
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single agreement to be resolved differently by different jurisdictions where
the jurisdictions' tests are distinct.140 Moreover, even with the broader non-
disavowal principle generally binding taxpayers to their chosen form, there
is typically some economic substance inherent in the form that the taxpayer
attempts to disavow.141 In contrast, a tax election, by definition, lacks
nontax economic substance, suggesting that any "disavowal" ought not to
be particularly troublesome. 142
D. Conclusion Regarding Reasons for Taxpayer Consistency
Neither the case law regarding state/federal consistency in non-elective
contexts nor the general judicial doctrines regarding taxpayer consistency
provides much guidance as to whether states should allow taxpayers to
make state elections that differ from their federal elections. The discussions
of election consistency in the foreign entity classification and alternative
minimum tax contexts may be more helpful, however.
Specifically, the discussion of elective U.S. classification of foreign
entities suggests that, the more problematic a state perceives tax arbitrage
opportunities posed by an election to be, the more the state should consider
binding the taxpayer to the taxpayer's federal tax choice. By forcing
taxpayers to balance the competing costs and benefits of the tax treatment in
the different jurisdictions, the state can try to limit the magnitude of tax
arbitrage opportunities. Additionally, the discussion of AMT elections
suggests that, the more a state (that conforms to the provision of a federal
tax election) values its status as separate and independent from the federal
government, the more that state should be willing to allow taxpayers to
make independent state-tax choices.
140 See IRS Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-48-005 (Nov. 28, 1997) (involving the U.S. federal tax
authority and a foreign tax authority).
141 See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 577 (1978) (respecting the
form of a transaction where the form reflected a "distinct element of economic reality");
Nat'l Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134, 149 (1974) (a taxpayer that engaged
in a direct exchange of assets is precluded from disavowing that form in favor of taxing the
transaction as an indirect exchange); Burnett v. Commonwealth Improvement Co., 287 U.S.
415 (1932) (a taxpayer that operated its business through a corporation is precluded from
disavowing the existence of that separate entity in favor of imposing tax as if the shareholder
owned the business assets directly); see also Baillif, supra note 138; William S. Blatt, Lost
on a One-Way Street: The Taxpayer's Ability to Disavow Form, 70 OR. L. REv. 381 (1991).
142 This, again, raises the question of the nature of a tax election. See supra notes 120-
122, and accompanying text. To the extent that a tax election is viewed as more than "pure
form" and instead conceived of as imbuing the situation with substantive facts that would be
meaningful to the state tax authority, then perhaps the nondisavowal principle may
strengthen the case for requiring taxpayers to make consistent federal and state tax elections.
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V. To BIND OR NOT TO BIND?
Based on the discussion of taxpayer consistency and based on the
earlier discussion about how the possibility of independent elections affects
the analysis of whether a state should conform to a federal tax election, this
part considers the arguments for using binding elections and independent
elections, in light of the alternative ways to implement each approach, and
this part considers how these arguments are altered when multi-state
taxpayers may face the same tax election in multiple states.
A. To Bind - One Set of Facts, One Tax Position
Parts III and IV suggest that a state may want to bind its taxpayers to
their federal tax elections for simplicity and administrability reasons and in
order to curtail possible arbitrage opportunities. The extent of these
benefits, however, varies depending on how a binding election is
implemented. One approach is to use a deemed federal choice, where the
taxpayer's federal choice is deemed to have been made for state tax
purposes, without any additional state-specific action by the taxpayer. A
state can take this approach, for example, by opting for a conformity
starting point that is calculated after taking into account the taxpayer's
federal election (e.g., if the starting point for conformity is federal taxable
income, that figure inherently reflects the taxpayer's federal choice whether
to take the standard deduction or itemized deductions). An alternate
approach to implementing a binding election is through mandatory
matching, where state mandates that the taxpayer make a state choice that
matches the taxpayer's federal choice. This will typically be necessary if a
state uses a conformity starting point that does not yet incorporate the
taxpayer's federal election (e.g., if the starting point for conformity is
federal adjusted gross income, that figure does not yet reflect the taxpayer's
choice regarding itemization).143
Where a state conforms to the provision of a federal tax election, both
methods of binding the taxpayer to its federal tax election can simplify
recordkeeping, ease the tax preparation burden, and reduce the risk of
taxpayer mistake,144 but a deemed federal choice confers these benefits
more effectively than a mandatory matching approach. The deemed federal
choice approach relieves the taxpayer from any obligation to take
affirmative state-specific steps to conform when preparing the taxpayer's
state tax return. In contrast, a mandatory matching choice requires taxpayers
143 A mandatory matching choice can be required even if the election occurs before the
starting point for conformity.
144 See supra Part Ill.B.1.
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to indicate their election choice for state purposes, and this may require a
separate filing. As a result of the need for additional action, a mandatory
matching choice may slightly increase the opportunity for intentional or
mistaken noncompliance, particularly where the taxpayer has an economic
incentive to make inconsistent elections (i.e., where an effective binding
election can increase state revenue).145
Binding elections also increase the state tax authority's ability to
benefit from information sharing with the Service and to rely on Service
enforcement actions.146 Again, these benefits are present whether the
taxpayer is bound via a deemed federal choice or a mandatory matching
choice. The latter, however, is not as effective as the former because, with a
mandatory matching choice, state tax authorities must spend time and
resources processing the separate (but matching) state elections and
confirming that the state elections match the federal elections. The
simplicity and administrability of binding choices are particularly beneficial
where an independent choice could allow the taxpayer to make a state
election that requires, for return preparation and for enforcement purposes,
information that is not on the taxpayer's federal return (i.e., where the
independent choice would result in non-facial conformity).
Moreover, binding elections can be used as a response to concerns
about tax arbitrage and to skepticism about the value of individual taxpayer
autonomy in the tax system. One response to these concerns would be for
the state to decouple from the federally provided tax election.147 Yet if the
state nevertheless conforms to the federal tax election, the state can still
curtail arbitrage and limit autonomy, albeit to a lesser degree, by requiring
the taxpayer to treat the taxpayer's federal election as binding for state tax
purposes. Further, the more strongly the state tax regime conforms to (and
values conformity to) the federal tax regime, the more the state ought to use
binding elections to tightly link the taxpayer's state tax treatment to the
taxpayer's federal tax treatment. The less that state legislators think of a tax
election as pure form and the more that state legislators conceive of a
federal tax election (once made) as the taxpayer's statement about the true
substance of the particular factual situation,148 the more binding elections
can be used to respect that substance for state tax purposes. Again, these
objectives can be advanced by both a deemed federal choice and a
mandatory matching choice, but the former is likely more effective for the
reasons discussed in this section.
145 See supra Part III.B.3.
146 See supra Part III.B.2.
147 See supra Part III.A.
148 See supra notes 120-122, and accompanying text.
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B. Not to Bind - Separate Tax Regimes, Separate Tax Choices
Parts III and IV suggest that different benefits can be conferred by
allowing a taxpayer to make choices about state tax elections that are
unconstrained by the taxpayer's federal election choices. Again, those
benefits can vary depending on the method of implementation. A state can
afford independent choice to taxpayers by either providing for a deemed
federal choice, where a taxpayer's state choice is the same as the taxpayer's
federal choice unless the taxpayer affirmatively elects otherwise, or by
allowing the taxpayer to make an unlinked choice.
The more that sovereignty concerns make a state wary of conformity
and the more that a state views its tax regime as separate and distinct from
the federal tax regime, the more the state ought to allow independent
choices (and, in particular, unlinked choices) in those situations where the
state tax regime does conform to a federal tax election. Similarly, where
state legislators provide a conforming election because they believe that the
election itself (and not just conformity to the election) advances state policy
objectives, those policy benefits of the election are stunted unless the
taxpayers can make an independent choice. That is, if the state provides the
election because state legislators value the election for state-specific
purposes, taxpayers should be able to choose freely among the election
alternatives for state purposes. Additionally, an unlinked choice more
clearly provides taxpayers with the option to elect than does a default
federal choice. Moreover, given that tax elections are largely mere form,
lacking meaningful nontax economic substance, the case for using binding
elections becomes less compelling.
Independent elections can also increase the simplicity of tax
planning.149 Independent elections, however, generally reduce the
simplicity of recordkeeping and tax preparation for taxpayers, and can
reduce a state's ability to enforce its tax laws, all as compared to binding
elections.150 These adverse effects may not be particularly problematic,
especially with respect to elections where taxpayers are likely to make the
same state and federal choices. A state may be able to increase the
frequency of aligned elections by providing the independent election as a
default federal choice rather than an unlinked choice. With a default federal
choice, taxpayers must opt out of, rather than opt into, consistent
state/federal elections. The "stickiness" of default rules suggests that more
taxpayers may end up with the same state and federal choices under a




default federal choice approach than under an unlinked choice approach. 5 1
This would increase the state tax authority's administration and
enforcement abilities, because when more taxpayers make state choices that
match their federal choices, the state tax authority is increasingly able to
rely on Service enforcement actions and on information exchange/sharing
with the Service. This benefit is particularly noteworthy if non-facial
conformity could result from a taxpayer's decision to make a state tax
choice that differs from the taxpayer's federal tax choice.152 Thus, the more
frequently that taxpayers with independent election choices are likely to
make aligned state and federal tax elections, the more an independent
election will be able to confer the simplicity and administrability benefits
that are provided by binding elections.
Ultimately, independent elections, whether default federal choices or
unlinked choices, are unlikely to advance simplicity and administrability as
effectively as binding elections. Nevertheless, default federal choices may
be an intermediate option, allowing independent choices, but still providing
at least some of the simplicity and administrability benefits of binding
elections. That said, an unlinked choice approach may be easier for
taxpayers to understand, in that the state tax election and federal tax
election present the same choice with the same default rule. This could be
less confusing for taxpayers than the default federal choice approach, which
imposes a different default rule for state tax purposes than is provided for
state tax purposes.153
C. Considering the Multi-State Perspective
The foregoing discussion also suggests that, where individual state
choices about whether to bind taxpayers to their federal tax choices create
significant externalities for multi-state taxpayers (complexity, tax
avoidance, multiple taxation, or otherwise), various approaches to
cooperative action may be appropriate. Given this possibility, state
151 See generally Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory
of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990) (discussing the power of default rules).
152 Consider the situation where the taxpayer elects Option A for federal tax purposes
and Option B for state tax purposes. If Option B requires the taxpayer to provide, and the
state tax authority to evaluate, information that is not needed for Option A and thus is not
reflected on the taxpayer's federal tax return, that non-facial conformity increases the burden
on state administrators. The less frequently this occurs, the lower the administrative burden
on the state tax authorities.
5 Consider a federal tax election, where Option X applies unless the taxpayer elects
Option Y. Assume a taxpayer elects Option Y for federal tax purposes. Under the default
federal choice approach, Option Y will also apply to the taxpayer for state tax purposes,
unless the taxpayer affirmatively elects back into Option X for state tax purposes.
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legislators should be sensitive to the adverse consequences their choices
about tax elections might create, lest they trigger multi-state coordination
efforts or Congressional action.
For example, states could collaborate and try to unify their approaches
to tax election conformity. Such collaborative action could be modeled after
the efforts to create the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act
(UDITPA) or after the SSTP, each of which was motivated, in large part, by
efforts to increase state-to-state conformity, thereby reducing complexity
for multi-state taxpayers.154
If the complexity and multiple taxation externalities created by
individual state approaches to tax elections are sufficiently severe and if the
states do not collaborate to address this problem, Congress may
intervene.155 For example, Congress may try to preempt state law,156 as
Congress considered before the multi-state collaboration efforts of
UDITPA 57 and as Congress did with respect to the taxation of internet
sales.158 Alternatively, Congress could encourage, rather than mandate,
conformity and bindingl 59 by providing incentives (monetary or otherwise)
to states that bind taxpayers to the federal tax elections for state tax
purposes.160 Instead, Congress could approach the issue at the level of the
154 See supra note 95 (explaining the source of the SSTP); Joe Huddleston & Shirley
Sicilian, The Project to Revise UDITPA, NYU INST. ON STATE & LOCAL TAX. § 1.02 (2009),
available at http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/MultistateTaxCommission/Uniformity/
Minutes/The%20Project%20to%20Revise%20UDITPA.pdf (explaining that UDITPA arose
in response to the desire to ease compliance through increased uniformity between state
income tax laws).
155 See Moore, supra note 30 (discussing approaches to, and the likelihood of, federal
intervention in state and local tax law).
156 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, 4.25 (discussing Congress' ability to
preempt state tax law pursuant to the Commerce Clause).
157 H.R. REP. No. 952, pt.. 4, at 1143 (1965); see also Huddleston & Sicilian, supra note
154, § 1.02[2] (discussing the Congress's federal intervention efforts that preceded
widespread adoption of UDITPA).
Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1104(5), 112 Stat. 2681 (1998),
as amended by Internet Tax Freedom Act Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-108,
121 Stat. 1024 (2007); see generally Walter Hellerstein, Internet Tax Freedom Act Limits
States'Power to Tax Internet Access and Electronic Commerce, 90 J. TAX'N 5 (1999).
159 This assumes, for purposes of illustrating methods of federal intervention, that
Congress would conclude that binding taxpayers to their elections is preferable from a multi-
state perspective because of the concerns about complexity, administration, and multiple
taxation. This is consistent with prior Congressional action, which typically advances
uniformity. See supra notes 156-158.
16o See, e.g., Federal-State Tax Collection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, 86 Stat. 919
(offering federal administration and collection of state taxes in order to incentivize states to
conform to the federal tax base); see generally Stark, supra note 20 (discussing how federal
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individual taxpayers, for example, by requiring each taxpayer to make the
same tax elections for federal purposes as the taxpayer made for state
purposes or by denying the federal tax benefit of the election unless the
taxpayer makes the consistent state tax election. Depending on the approach
to coordination, state legislators could lose some or all of their decision-
making power over the question of whether to bind taxpayers to their
federal tax elections for state purposes, thereby sacrificing some degree of
sovereignty.
VI. ANSWERING THE ELECTION CONFORMITY QUESTION: EXAMPLES
Although legislators in different states will weigh the costs and benefits
of conformity and binding differently, the foregoing analysis suggests that
state legislators should be particularly wary of providing for, or allowing,
deviation from a taxpayer's federal tax election (i.e., by decoupling or by
allowing taxpayers to make independent choices for conforming state
elections) where simplicity and administrability problems of independent
elections are likely to be particularly acute: (a) if a tax election arises prior
to the state's federal conformity starting point, or (b) if such deviation could
require, for state tax compliance and enforcement purposes, information
that is not provided on the federal tax return. Moreover, state legislators
should be careful when making decisions about conformity and binding to
federal tax elections that could increase complexity and decrease fairness
for multi-state taxpayers.
This part applies this article's analysis to the three examples with
which this article's introduction began: the choice between itemized and
standard deduction, a married couple's choice to file jointly or separately,
and the choice to tax an actual stock acquisition as a deemed asset
acquisition. To the extent they are familiar with any particular federal tax
election, readers may wish to focus primarily on the background with
respect to the state income tax consequences of the election, or readers may
want to skip the relevant background section entirely and proceed directly
to the relevant analysis.
A. ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS VS. STANDARD DEDUCTION
1. Background
For federal income tax purposes, an individual has the option of
itemizing deductions or taking the standard deduction.161 Typically, a
laws can be used to influence the design of state tax laws); Shanske, supra note 20 (same).
161 I.R.C. § 63. For the 2008 taxable year, itemized deductions were taken on
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taxpayer will want to itemize deductions if the itemized deductions exceed
the standard deduction.162 Briefly, itemized deductions163 include state and
local taxes,164 home mortgage interest,16 5 and charitable contributions, 166
among others. 167 Generally, itemized deductions are provided to advance
"either of two basic rationales: equitable distribution of the tax burden or
encouragement of worth-while expenditures."1
68
In lieu of itemizing, a taxpayer can take a standard deduction of a fixed
amount.169 The standard deduction serves both simplification and
progressivity functions.170 It simplifies the income tax by relieving many
taxpayers from the burden of tracking and calculating itemized
deductions, 1 and by relieving tax administrators from the burden of
enforcing the limits on those itemized deductions. Further, the standard
deduction adds progressivity to the tax system by ensuring that a minimum
amount of income is not subject to tax. 172
Most states with income taxes also allow for itemized deductions or a
standard deduction. States vary, however, with respect to which itemized
deductions they allow, and states vary with respect to the amount of their
standard deductions. 173 Further, states take a variety of approaches to the
approximately one-third of all federal income tax returns filed. IRS Statistics of Income
Division, 2008 Individual Income Tax Returns, Publication 1304, Rev. 07-2010, tbl.1.2
[hereinafter IRS 2008 Tax Statistics].
162 Taxpayers can elect to take itemized deductions even if they do not exceed the
standard deduction, but the taxpayers must affirmatively check a box on Schedule A in order
to indicate that this is what they want to do. IRS Form 1040, Schedule A (2010).
163 These include allowable deductions other than those deductions listed in section
62(a) and other than the deduction for personal exemptions. I.R.C. § 63(d).
164 I.R.C. § 164.
165 I.R.C. § 163(h).
166 I.R.C. § 170.
167 These three categories of itemized deductions are the most commonly taken by, and
the most valuable to, itemizers. IRS 2008 Tax Statistics, supra note 162, at tbl.2. 1.
168 Allan J. Samansky, Nonstandard Thoughts about the Standard Deduction, 1991
UTAH L. REv. 531, 541 (1991) (citations omitted).
169 For 2011, the federal standard deduction under section 63(c)(2) for a single
individual is $5,800. Rev. Proc. 2011-12, 2011-2 I.R.B. 297.
170 See John R. Brooks, II, Doing Too Much: The Standard Deduction and the Conflict
Between Progressivity and Simplfication, 2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 205 (2011); Samansky, supra
note 168, at 533-40.
171 The tradeoff is that, with this simplification, the precision of income measurement is
diminished.
172 Brooks, supra note 170, at 224-26 (arguing that these two functions should be
disaggregated); Samansky, supra note 168; see also Louis Kaplow, The Standard Deduction
and Floors in the Income Tax, 50 TAx. L. REv. 1 (1994).
173 See RIA, ALL STATES TAx GUIDE 228-A.5 (2012) (collecting state-by-state
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question of whether a taxpayer's choice to itemize or to take the standard
deduction for federal income tax purposes is binding on the taxpayer for
state income tax purposes.174
A taxpayer may or may not want to make the same choice for federal
and state tax purposes. For example, a taxpayer who itemizes for federal
income tax purposes primarily because she pays a large amount of state
taxes might want to take the standard deduction for state income tax
purposes since states generally do not allow an itemized deduction for state
income taxes. 175 In contrast, a taxpayer who takes the standard deduction
for federal income tax purposes may want to itemize for state income tax
purposes where the state allows certain additional deductions that are
valuable to the taxpayer.176
2. Analysis
Several factors should affect a state's decision as to whether to provide
taxpayers with the choice between itemized deductions and the standard
deduction (the conformity question), and a state's decision as to whether a
taxpayer provided with such a choice should be obligated to make the same
choice for state purposes as the taxpayer made for federal purposes (the
binding question). These analyses should focus primarily on the individual
state perspective because the itemization election is only available for
personal income tax purposes and because most individual taxpayers pay
state income tax in only one state.177
information); Wis. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, supra note 25 (providing detailed
information about each state's standard deduction amounts and each state's allowable
itemized deductions).
174 See, e.g., supra notes 1-4, 69, and accompanying text.
175 For example, the Oregon Department of Revenue indicates that this is the primary
reason that an Oregon taxpayer who itemizes for federal income tax purposes might decide
to take the standard deduction for Oregon state tax purposes. OR. DEP'T OF REVENUE,
OREGON PERSONAL INCOME TAX STATISTICS: CHARACTERISTICS OF FILERS, TAX YEAR 2009,
at 27 (2011), http://www.oregon.gov/dor/STATS/docs/101_406_11/101-406-1 1.pdf
[hereinafter, OREGON 2009 TAx STATISTICS]. See generally Wis. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL
BUREAU, supra note 25, at 11 (noting which states allow deductions for state and/or federal
taxes paid).
176 For example, Oregon allows a special medical deduction for taxpayers sixty-two
years of age and older; this deduction is an important reason why an Oregon taxpayer who
takes the standard deduction for federal income tax purposes might decide to itemize
deductions for Oregon state tax purposes. In 2009, a higher percentage of Oregon state
income tax returns with AGI below $100,000 used itemized deductions for state purposes
than used them for federal tax purposes. OREGON 2009 TAx STATISTICS, supra note 175.
177 Accordingly, the possibility of multi-state coordination ought to have little impact
on the states' approach to the itemization election. State legislators in states where multi-
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A state's response to the conformity question depends, in large part, on
whether and to what extent the state values the simplicity and/or
progressivity afforded by the standard deduction and whether and to what
extent the state values (and thus provides for) the particular deductions that
would be itemized. These questions raise a state sovereignty issue because
state legislators may balance these concerns differently than does Congress.
For example, if a state determines that some but not all of the federal
itemized deductions are appropriate for the state constituency or if a state
enacts additional itemized deductions that are specifically tailored to the
state constituency, the state may opt to conform to the election but
decouple from some of the federal itemized deductions.179 Alternatively, if
a state determines that the simplicity and administrability of the standard
deduction are substantially more beneficial to the state than most itemized
deductions would be to the state taxpayers, the state may just opt to
decouple from the election and mandate that all taxpayers take the standard
deduction. 180
If a state decides to provide taxpayers with the choice to itemize
deductions or to take the standard deduction (as most states with income
state individual taxpayers are somewhat more common (e.g., perhaps Connecticut and New
York) might also consider the multi-state perspective, however. In these states, legislators
should also consider whether taxpayers are likely to have incentives to make different
itemization elections in the multiple states, and if so, whether the availability of independent
elections is likely to have a significant impact on compliance complexity for large numbers
of taxpayers and/or substantially increase the risk of multiple taxation, again, for large
numbers of taxpayers.
178 States may add state-specific itemized deductions for various reasons, including
federalism concerns. Specifically, query whether a state should allow a taxpayer to take a
state-level itemized deduction for his federal income taxes paid. Some states do, and others
do not. RIA, supra note 173, 230 (indicating which states allow such a deduction); see
generally Wis. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, supra note 25, at 11. This is just the reverse of
the more commonly asked question of whether taxpayers should be able to take a deduction
on their federal income taxes for state income taxes paid. See, e.g., Galle, supra note 37, at
14.
179 This is a common approach, though states vary with respect to the specific itemized
deductions and the size of the standard deduction. RIA, supra note 173, 1 228-A.5
(collecting state-by-state information); see also Wis. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, supra
note 25, at 11.
1so State legislators might decide to decouple from an election based on a different
balance of the competing policy considerations. Consider a state that believes that its income
tax system should be less progressive; the state may decouple and either provide no
standard/itemized deductions at all or provide only a relatively small mandatory standard
deduction. Consider also a state that values precision in the measurement of income more




taxes do), the state must address the binding question - should a
taxpayer's federal choice whether to itemize be binding for state tax
purposes? This assessment should depend largely on how the state
legislators value simplicity, administrability, and sovereignty
considerations.
A state can reap significant simplicity and administrability benefits by
binding each taxpayer to the itemization election made for federal tax
purposes. This is particularly true if the state binds taxpayers though a
deemed federal choice approach, by choosing federal taxable income as the
state's federal starting point for conformity. Where a state uses federal
adjusted gross income (rather than federal taxable income) as its
conformity starting point,182 however, the state will need to take a
mandatory matching approach if the state wants to bind taxpayers to their
federal election on the itemization question. That still provides simplicity
and administrability benefits, although likely less effectively than a deemed
federal choice.
The price of this ease is sovereignty. As the state's itemized deductions
diverge from the federal itemized deductions, the simplicity and
administrability benefits of binding elections decline, and the tax planning
complexities presented by binding elections increase. Thus, the more a
state's itemized deductions differ from the federal itemized deductions, the
more the state should consider allowing taxpayers to make an independent
choice about whether to itemize. This is particularly true where state
legislators have added state-specific itemized deductions that reflect the
values, ideals, or preferences of the state taxpayers, and where the state
legislators want all state taxpayers (and not just those state taxpayers who
itemized for federal tax purposes) to be able to take advantage of the state-
specific deduction.
Nevertheless, even where a state's itemized deductions diverge notably
from the federal itemized deductions, binding a subset of taxpayers (by
mandating that taxpayers who take the standard deduction for federal tax
purposes also take the standard deduction for state tax purposes) can still
confer simplicity and administrability benefits. By prohibiting federal non-
itemizers from itemizing for state purposes, states can try to avoid non-
facial conformity problems, where taxpayers will need to provide
information to the state tax authority (i.e., details about the state itemized
181 RIA, supra note 173, 228-A.5.
182 See State Personal Income Taxes: Federal Starting Points, supra note 14, at 7.
183 This divergence could occur with respect to the limits on the availability of
particular itemized deductions, the amounts of particular itemized deductions, and/or the




deductions) that the taxpayer did not already provide to the Service. 184
This suggests that, by bifurcating the decision about which taxpayers
are bound, a state may be able to allow taxpayers the autonomy to make
independent choices, but limit that opportunity to those situations that are
least likely to create significantly increased administrative problems.
Specifically, if the starting point for state conformity is federal adjusted
gross income, then a state should consider bifurcating the binding decision
- allowing federal itemizers to make unlinked state choices, but requiring
federal non-itemizers to take the standard deduction for state tax
185purposes.
Admittedly, allowing any independent choice generally reduces state
revenue. Query, however, whether the state ought to be entitled to any extra
revenue that would be collected as a result of binding the taxpayer to make
the same itemization/standard deduction choice as the taxpayer made for
federal tax purposes. Any increase in state revenue arising from binding
taxpayers to their federal itemization choicel86 actually comes from a
reallocation, from the state taxpayers to the state fisc, of a tax benefit that
Congress intended to provide to the state taxpayers. Where a state
essentially claims part of this federal tax benefit, the state may undermine
Congress's policy objective of increasing fairness or incentivizing socially
useful actions through the particular itemized deductions.
18 The non-facial conformity problem is really only present when taxpayers who took
the standard deduction for federal purposes want to itemize for state purposes. In the reverse
situation, where a taxpayer took itemized deductions for federal purposes and wants to take
the standard deduction for state purposes, independent choice does not create a non-facial
conformity problem. Indeed, less information would generally be needed for the state tax
return, not more. Thus, in this situation, independent choice does not make enforcement of
the state income tax particularly more onerous than enforcement would be under a binding
choice approach. In fact, allowing independent choice in this situation may actually increase
simplicity because taxpayers do not have to worry about comparing the state and federal tax
value of an election choice in order to determine which choice results in the greatest net
benefit; the taxpayer can just make the choice that is tax minimizing for each jurisdiction
without the planning complexities of binding elections.
185 If state legislators want to add a state-specific deduction that they believe should be
available to all state taxpayers, perhaps that deduction can be incorporated as an additional
nonitemized deduction, such that a taxpayer could take the special state deduction in addition
to taking the standard deduction.
186 This assumes that a particular election choice decreases federal taxes more than the
choice increases state taxes.
187 See supra note 90.
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B. Married Filing Jointly vs. Married Filing Separately
1. Background
Consider an additional example: the federal income tax system and
most state income tax systems generally allow married couples to elect
whether to file jointly or separately. Only a very small percentage of
married couples file separate federal income tax returnsl89 because filing
separately generally results in a higher aggregate federal tax burden for the
couple than would filing jointly.190 In contrast, because of the structure of
state rate brackets, married couples filing separately may have a lower
aggregate state tax burden than they would if filing jointly.191 As a result,
many married couples may have an economic incentive to use different
filing statuses for federal and state tax purposes, preferring to file jointly for
federal income tax purposes and separately for state income tax
192purposes.
Some states, like Montana, allow married couples to use a different
filing status for state tax purposes than the couples used for federal income
tax purposes.193 Other states, like California and New York, generally
188 Some married couples, like couples where one spouse is a U.S. citizen and the other
is a nonresident alien, are required to file separately for federal income tax purposes. This
discussion focuses on those married couples that are entitled to make a choice between joint
and separate filing. Note, also, that this discussion focuses on taxpayers who are treated as
married for both federal and state income tax purposes, setting aside differences in federal
and state definitions of "marriage." See generally Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly,
48 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 805 (2008) (discussing the federal tax treatment applicable when
the federal and state concepts of family/marriage differ); see also supra note 67.
189 For taxable year 2008, the Service received approximately 53.7 million married
filing jointly returns and approximately 2.7 million married filing separately returns. IRS
2008 Tax Statistics, supra note 161.
190 Married filing separately is generally disadvantageous for several reasons, including
because (a) for couples where one spouse earns much more than the other, the rate brackets
operate such that the couple will usually pay less tax if they file jointly; and (b) many federal
tax benefits are not available for married taxpayers filing separately. Nevertheless, married
couples may want to file separately either to avoid joint and several liability for the other
spouse's tax liability or to enable a lower earning spouse to take certain deductions, such as
medical expenses, that are subject to AGI floors. See generally James Edward Maule,
Income Tax Liability: Concepts & Calculations, BNA U.S. INCOME PORTFOLIOS: INCOME,
DEDUCTIONS, CREDITS & COMPUTATION OF TAx, 5 0 7 -3rd I.B.
9 For example, consider the state of Montana, where married two-earner couples will
usually pay less Montana tax in the aggregate if they file separately rather than jointly. See
Memorandum from Dan Dodds, supra note 5, at 4-9 (providing examples to illustrate this
phenomenon).
192 See, e.g., supra note 5 and accompanying text.
193 See also, e.g., supra note 71 (noting that Iowa generally takes the same approach as
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require that married couples who file jointly for federal income tax
purposes also file jointly for state income tax purposes,194 and require that
married couples who file separately for federal income tax purposes also
file separately for state income tax purposes. Where states allow married
taxpayers to make independent filing status elections, rational taxpayers
will generally make tax-minimizing choices, which, in many circumstances,
means using different filing statuses for state and federal purposes. Where
states require married taxpayers to use the same filing status as the couple
used for federal income tax purposes, rational taxpayers will calculate
which filing status provides the greatest net tax minimization. 195
2. Analysis
Again, several factors, including sovereignty, administrability, and
revenue concerns, affect a state's decisions whether to provide married
couples with a choice of filing status and whether to require a married
couple to use the same filing status for state purposes as the couple used for
federal purposes. These questions are merely a subset of the issues state
legislators must address when determining how the state should approach
the taxation of married couples.196
A state's treatment of marriage, in general, reflects the way in which
the particular state resolves the conflict between the goals of marriage
neutrality, progressivity, and equal treatment of married couples.'9 7 This
decision can be driven by deeply held beliefs about marriage, gender, and
fairness. Extensive literature considers how marriage is, and should be,
Montana on this issue).
194 Of course, there are exceptions to this rule, for example where one spouse is an out-
of-state resident.
195 For example, a married couple residing in a state that binds married couples to their
federal filing statuses would likely prefer to file jointly if filing jointly reduces the couple's
federal income tax burden by $3,000, even if filing jointly increases the couple's state
income tax burden by $500. See generally RIA Tax Alerts Developments, 2009 Law
Changes Make Separate Filing Better for Many Married Upper-Income New York Couples,
RIA article ta-072009-0046 (July, 14, 2009).
196 Other such issues include the number and width of the rate brackets, the applicable
tax rates, and the amount and availability of particular tax deductions and credits.
197 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX 2-6 (1997) (explaining the policy conflict that leads to debate over marriage
penalties and marriage bonuses); Gregg A. Esenwein, Income Taxation of Married Couples:
Background and Analysis, 90 TAX NOTES 1081, 1082-84 (Feb. 19, 2001) (discussing
"conflicting goals of equity" in the application of the income tax to couples); see also Boris
I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1395-96, 1416-
19 (1975); Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 54 TAx L. REV. 1, 6-7, n.26 (2000).
2013] 579
Virginia Tax Review
treated for income tax purposes, and this discussion does not aim to
retread that ground or to argue for any particular approach advocated by
commentators. Rather, this part acknowledges that, in order to reflect the
values and preferences of the taxpayers in a particular state, the state's
legislators may want to tax married couples differently than does Congress.
For example, a state's legislators may want to approach marriage bonuses
and marriage penalties 99 and/or joint and several liability differently than
Congress does. Where these issues may involve a married couple's ability
to elect filing status, state legislators must consider how to implement these
state-specific policies.
In an effort to define the taxable economic unit differently than
Congress does, states may consider decoupling from the filing status
election and eliminating married couples' ability to make a choice about
filing status. A state could provide state-specific mandatory treatment for
taxpayers, for example, possibly requiring all married couples to file
jointly,200 or requiring each taxpayer (married or not) to file as a single
individual. Because the filing status decision occurs at the very beginning
of the tax preparation process and may affect so many income and
deduction calculations throughout the tax preparation process,201 a state that
decouples and adopts a different definition of the taxable economic unit
198 See, e.g., Amy C. Christian, Joint and Several Liability and the Joint Return: Its
Implication for Women, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 535 (1998); Lily Kahng, One is the Loneliest
Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return World, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 651 (2010);
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint
Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63 (1993); Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the
Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 983
(1993); Shari Motro, A New "I Do": Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L.
REv. 1509 (2006); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 339
(1994); Wendy Richards, Comment, An Analysis of Recent Tax Reforms from a Marital-Bias
Perspective: It is Time to Oust Marriage from the Tax Code, 2008 Wisc. L. REv. 611 (2008).
199 These terms are usually used when comparing the tax burden of two single people to
the tax burden of those same two people if they are married to each other. The concept is
similarly applicable in the married filing jointly/married filing separately context, in that a
married couple filing separately may pay more or less tax than that same couple filing
jointly. That said, the issues may be less pressing in the joint/separate filing context than in
the single/married context, in that the former does not affect the couple's nontax decision
whether to marry.
200 For example, Pennsylvania generally requires married taxpayers to file jointly,
except in very limited situations specified by the statute. 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7331 (2012);
61 PA. CODE § 117.2. (1972).
201 Such calculations typically include how income and deductions are allocated
between spouses. Cf Richard B. Malamud, Allocation of the Joint Return Marriage Penalty
and Bonus, 15 VA. TAX REv. 489 (1996) (discussing the complexities that arise when
income, deductions, and tax liability must be allocated between spouses).
[Vol. 32:527580
Binding Choices
risks foregoing most of the simplification and administration benefits of
conformity. Decoupling can complicate both compliance and enforcement,
unless the state also adopts a significantly simpler tax base. 202
Thus, it may be in states' interests to conform to the federal income tax
system's definition of taxable economic units and to conform to the election
regarding married filing status. If a state conforms to the election, then it
must also determine whether to bind taxpayers to their federal filing status
choices. This determination, again, requires state legislators to make
difficult tradeoffs between simplicity, administrability, revenue, and state
and personal autonomy.
Consider a state that conforms to the filing status election, but allows
married taxpayers to make an independent state choice because, for
example, state legislators are particularly concerned about marriage
penalties. By not binding married couples to their federal filing statuses,
taxpayers can freely opt for the state filing status that best reduces any state
marriage penalty. This is likely to increase complexity and decrease the
administrability of the state tax system. With independent choice, as with
decoupling, the taxpayer's state tax computations may be different from the
taxpayer's federal tax computations, so the risk of mistake/noncompliance
may increase, and the state largely foregoes the ability to check the
accuracy of the reported information using the taxpayer's federal returns.203
For example, where a couple files jointly for federal purposes and
separately for state purposes, the couple must allocate its income and
expenses between the spouses for state purposes only. This results in non-
facial conformity because the taxpayers must determine, and the state must
evaluate, information that was not needed for federal purposes, diminishing
the state's ability to benefit from information sharing with the Service and
precluding the state from relying on Service enforcement actions to police
the allocation between the spouses.
These complexity and administrability concerns can be particularly
difficult with this election because the federal filing status election occurs
prior to the state's starting point for federal conformity. That is, if a married
couple is allowed to use a state filing status that is different from its federal
filing status, state conformity to the provision of the election produces little
administrative benefit because the computation of the couple's state tax
202 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2-102 (1985) (imposing a personal income tax just
on dividends and interest).
203 This issue is mitigated somewhat by the option, provided by many states, of filing
separately on the same form. See supra note 7. If the spouses file separately on the same
form rather than on separate forms, it is not as difficult for the state tax authorities to
compare the sum of their individual items of income and expense to the joint income and
expenses reflected on the federal tax return.
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burden cannot begin from the couple's joint federal AGI (or TI) because,
for state purposes, the spouses are not filing jointly as a couple. In contrast,
if a married couple is generally bound to its federal filing status, states have
a much greater ability to rely on the figure used as the couple's conformity
starting point. The couple can focus their tax-preparation efforts, and the
state can focus its resources, on only those state-specific calculations
needed to get from the couple's conformity starting point (say, federal AG)
to the couple's state taxable income.
Given the significant complexity and administrative problems that can
arise when a married couple's state filing status is different from the
couple's federal filing status, a state should consider whether there is a way
to reflect state-specific values regarding the proper treatment of marriage,
without decoupling or allowing independent elections. For example, a state
may be able to mitigate the risk of marriage penalties without allowing
taxpayers independent choice by changing the size and rates for the tax
brackets applicable to married couples, or by allowing married couples to
take an additional deduction in order to eliminate the extra tax cost that
would otherwise be imposed because their federal election was binding for
state purposes.204 Thus, the state could generally benefit from the simplicity
and administrability benefits of conformity and binding, while still
implementing a state-specific tax policy that reflects state-specific beliefs
regarding marriage and fairness. This seems to be a very beneficial result,
assuming sufficient revenue can still be collected. 205
In contrast, if the state binds married couples to their federal filing
statuses without making other rate/bracket/deduction changes to mitigate a
potential marriage penalty, state revenue could increase.206 Ultimately,
when deciding how to approach the filing status election for married
couples, a state must make difficult trade-offs between sovereignty,
simplicity/administrability, and revenue.
As with the election to take the standard deduction or to itemize
deductions, this discussion has approached the analysis from an individual
state perspective because most individual taxpayers pay state income tax in
only one state.207 As discussed below with respect to the section 338(h)(10)
204 These are among the alternatives that Montana is considering.
205 Revenue collections may be problematic because this approach is likely revenue
reducing; recall that this approach largely aims to afford the taxpayers the same economics
as independent filing status choice, but without sacrificing the simplicity and administrability
benefits of binding choice.
206 The federal benefit of filing jointly rather than separately likely exceeds the
additional state cost of filing jointly, so the couple would likely file jointly in order to
minimize net tax burden.
207 To the extent that a state has a significant number of multi-state individual
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election, the multi-state perspective is likely to become more important in
the context of business elections because large numbers of businesses
operate in multiple states.
C. Actual Stock Acquisition vs. Deemed Asset Acquisition
1. Background
Consider a third example, this one involving businesses rather than
individuals: when a corporation makes a "qualified stock purchase" 208 of an
S corporation or of a corporate subsidiary, the federal income tax system
allows the parties to opt (by making a section 338(h)(10) election) to treat
the actual stock purchase as a deemed asset purchase for federal income tax
purposes.209 When the section 338(h)(10) election is available, it is
typically advisable for federal income tax purposes.210 This is because the
election often benefits both the buyer (because the post-transaction target
corporation receives fair market value basis in its assets, which is beneficial
if the assets are appreciated)211 and the seller (if the gain inherent in the
target corporation's assets is less than the gain inherent in the seller's stock
in the target corporation).212 Even where a section 338(h)(10) election will
cause the seller to recognize more gain (i.e., because the gain inherent in the
target corporation's assets is greater than the gain inherent in the seller's
stock in the target corporation), the buyer may be willing to share the value
of its tax benefit with the seller in order to compensate the seller for its
increased tax cost resulting from the section 338(h)(10) election. 213
Most states conform to the section 338(h)(10) election at least for
taxpayers, however, state legislators should increasingly consider the multi-state perspective.
208 I.R.C. § 338(d)(3) (defining a "qualified stock purchase" as the acquisition, within a
twelve-month period, of at least eighty percent of the vote and value of the stock of the target
corporation).
209 I.R.C. § 338(h)(10).
210 MARTIN D. GINSBURG & JACK S. LEVIN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND BUYOUTS: A
TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE GOVERNING TAX, LEGAL, AND ACCOUNTING
CONSIDERATIONS 206 (Jan. 2012 ed.). This is in marked contrast to regular section 338
elections, which are rarely advisable because they typically result in an increase in the
current tax imposed on the transaction. Id. 205.
211 Treas. Reg. § 1.338(h)(10)-l(d)(2) (2007). Basis step-up is often important to the
buyer because the step up in basis of the target corporation's assets avoids the possibility that
multiple levels of corporate tax could be imposed on the sale.
212 I.R.C. § 338(h)(10)(A) (providing that gain is calculated based on a deemed asset
sale and that the actual stock sale is disregarded).
213 Field, supra note 97, at 15-21 (discussing the bargaining dynamic between the buyer
and seller in the context of a transaction in which a section 338(h)(10) election is made).
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certain types of target corporations.214 Where the target corporation and its
shareholders are all taxpayers in one state only (say, State X), then the
taxpayers will generally want to make the same election for state income
tax purposes as is made for federal income tax purposes. Where the target
corporation and/or its shareholders pay income taxes in different states,
however, the total income tax levied on the transaction may be reduced if
the election can be made for some state jurisdictions and not for others.
This is because the states may have different tax bases and because unique
state tax issues (including the allocation and apportionment of income) arise
for multi-state taxpayers.
For a simplified example, assume that the target corporation is subject
to tax only in State X (which imposes a ten percent income tax) and that the
target corporation is wholly owned by a parent corporation that is subject to
tax only in State Y (which imposes a five percent income tax).215 If the
parent corporation sells all of the stock of the target corporation to a buyer
corporation and no election is made for either state's purposes, the
transaction generates gain from the sale of stock, which is likely
nonbusiness income to the nondomiciliary parent corporation.216 The
nonbusiness income would be allocable to State Y217 and the parent
corporation would be taxable, at State Y's five-percent tax rate, on the gain
from the stock sale. If the election is effective for both states' purposes, the
transaction generates gain from the deemed sale of the target corporation's
assets, which is more likely to be business income218 apportionable to the
214 BNA Special Report, supra note 11, at S-94 to S-95 (Apr. 22, 2011) (reporting the
results of a fifty-state survey about whether states conform to the federal section 338(h)(10)
election for C corporation targets and/or for S corporation targets). See generally Andrew N.
Needham, Consequences of a Section 338(h)(10) Election at the State Level, 48 TAX NOTEs
1681 (Sept. 24, 1990) (discussing the variety of ways in which states could treat a transaction
for which a section 338(h)(10) election has been made at the federal level). There has been
significant judicial and legislative action at the state level since the Needham article, but it
provides a useful background about the wide variation in possible state approaches.
215 This example further assumes that the subsidiary and parent are not part of a unitary
business.
216 See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, 7.14[ 1].
217 Unif. Div. of Income for Tax Purposes Act §§ 4-8 (1957) [hereinafter UDITPA]
(allocating nonbusiness income to the taxpayer's domiciliary state); see generally
HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, 9.11 (discussing whether gain from the sale
of stock is treated as business or nonbusiness income for state tax apportionment/allocation
purposes).
218 BNA Special Report, supra note 11, at S-96 to S-97 (reporting the results of a fifty-
state survey regarding whether the states treat gain from a section 338(h)(10) transaction as
apportionable business income or allocable nonbusiness income). This example assumes that
both State X and State Y treat 338(h)(10) gain in the same way, as either apportionable
business income or allocable nonbusiness income. The analysis is more complicated if this is
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state in which the business is operated (here, State X).219 Thus, the target
corporation would be taxable at State X's ten-percent tax rate on the gain
from the deemed asset sale. 22 If there is no election in one state (say, State
X) but there is an effective election for the other state (State Y), the
transaction could escape state income taxation entirely; for State X
purposes, the transaction would be taxed as an actual stock sale, generating
nonbusiness income allocated entirely to State Y, but for State Y purposes,
the transaction would be taxed as a deemed asset sale, generating business
income apportioned entirely to State X.221
That is, while a section 338(h)(10) election may be tax minimizing
from a federal income tax perspective, it may not be tax minimizing from
the perspective of one or more state income tax(es). Thus, if independent
elections are allowed, taxpayers may wish to make different choices for
federal and state purposes, and taxpayers may also wish to make different
elections for different states. The analysis becomes more complicated when
the target corporation and/or shareholder(s) each pay income tax in multiple
states (particularly if the relevant states have different definitions of
"business income" and/or different apportionment formulae), but the
concept remains the same. That is, if independent section 338(h)(10)
elections are allowed, the sale of a multi-state business is susceptible to tax
planning which could enable taxpayers to be subject to less than full state
income taxation on the transaction.222
Most states, however, prohibit independent section 338(h)(10)
elections.223 Rather, they typically bind taxpayers to their federal choice.224
Where the federal election is binding, rational taxpayers will, again,
calculate whether the election is tax minimizing, taking into account the tax
imposed by all taxing jurisdictions.
not true.
219 UDITPA § 9; see generally HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, 9.02.
220 This also assumes that the gain upon the deemed liquidation of the target
corporation is treated by State Y as business income, such that the deemed liquidation would
not trigger the recognition of gain that is taxable in State Y.
221 See supra note 220.
222 See Petrik & Millar, supra note 40, at 20-21 (discussing such planning
opportunities); Crawford & Uzes, supra note 21, 1 1140.06B(7) (same).
223 BNA Special Report, supra note 11, at S-94 to S-95 (indicating that very few states
allow taxpayers to make a federal but not state election or to make a state but not federal
election).
224 Id. (noting that, for most such states, the binding state election is deemed to be made




Once more, a variety of factors influence a state's decision about
whether to afford a section 338(h)(10) election at the state level and
whether to bind taxpayers to the choice made at the federal level. Given the
prevalence of multi-state business, this analysis must include not only the
individual state perspective, but also the multi-state perspective.
From the individual state perspective, the section 338(h)(10) election is
less laden with community-specific value judgments than is, for example,
the married filing status election.225 This suggests that sovereignty concerns
are less likely to drive state legislators to decouple from the section
338(h)(10) election.
Where the election is available at the state level, simplicity,
administrability, and revenue issues are presented if states allow taxpayers
to make independent elections. These issues include the possibility that
independent elections may reduce tax-planning complexity because
taxpayers would not need to compare the magnitude of tax benefits and
costs from different jurisdictions in order to make tax-minimizing
choices.226 Yet independent elections likely increase compliance
complexity for several reasons because any 338(h)(10) election clearly
arises prior to the state's federal conformity starting point. Further, if a
section 338(h)(10) election is made at the federal level, but not at the state
level (or vice versa), then different taxpayers may be responsible for taxes
on the transaction gain. For example, where the target corporation is
affiliated (but not consolidated) with the parent corporation, the target pays
the tax on the gain if an election is made, but the parent pays the tax on the
gain if no election is made.227 Moreover, if there is an election for one
jurisdiction and not another, the amounts of gain recognized and the
character of the gain likely differ.228 As a result, the recognition of different
amounts of gain and the involvement of different taxpayers can increase
compliance complexity for taxpayers, in that the way a taxpayer reports the
transaction for federal tax purposes may be of very little help when the
taxpayer is determining how to report the transaction for state tax purposes.
225 The section 338(h)(10) election serves primarily to reconcile the discontinuity
between the way the tax code treats stock purchases of businesses and asset purchases of
businesses. See Field, supra note 17, at 35-46. Cf supra Part VI.B.2. (discussing how a
state's decision about how to handle the filing status of married couples reflects the state's
values about marriage, gender, and fairness).
226 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
227 See GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 210, 206.2.2.
228 See id. 206.1.2, 206.3.3 (noting that a section 338(h)(10) election can change the
amount and character of gain recognized from the transaction).
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Nevertheless, multi-state businesses engaged in section 338(h)(10) election
transactions likely use professional tax preparers, so the increase in
compliance complexity for taxpayers may not be terribly problematic.
The administrability impact on state tax authorities of different federal
and state 338(h)(10) elections, however, can be significant. Where a
different amount of gain is recognized for state and federal purposes, and
particularly where a different taxpayer is responsible for that gain for state
and federal purposes, the state tax authority basically foregoes its ability to
piggy-back on the enforcement efforts of the Service. Administrability
issues can be particularly problematic if the election is made at the state
level but not at the federal level. This situation results in non-facial
conformity because the purchase price would have to be allocated among
the assets deemed purchased for state tax purposes, but no allocation would
need to be made for federal tax purposes. Additionally, the state would have
to determine whether the transaction met the eligibility requirements for the
election, but no such eligibility inquiry would be needed at the federal level.
These issues create even more work for the state tax authorities because
they cannot rely on the Service's assessment of eligibility and
reasonableness of purchase price allocation. This suggests that a state may
be able to advance simplicity and administrability by prohibiting taxpayers
from making a state-level election if they have not also made a federal-level
election, or by (more generally) binding taxpayers to their federal section
338(h)(10) elections.
Given the prevalence of businesses that operate in multiple states, state
legislators ought to consider not only the policy implications of federal-to-
state section 338(h)(10) election conformity and binding, but they should
also take into account the implications of state-to-state coordination with
respect to this election. The multi-state perspective allows state legislators
to determine how their decisions about state-level section 338(h)(10)
elections impact their state's business environment, affect their state's
taxpayers who also operate in other states, and alter the risk of federal
intervention with respect to this issue.
The complexity concerns raised by state-level section 338(h)(10)
elections can be exacerbated when the seller and/or target corporation
operates in multiple states. The magnification of the complexity problem,
however, stems less from the possibility of making different election
choices in different states, and more from differences in the underlying
states' income tax laws. That is, significant complexity exists regardless of
whether multi-state taxpayers are required to make the same election choice
in multiple states because the complexity arises from different states'
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eligibility requirements for the election,229 from different states' treatment
of section 338(h)(10) gain from the deemed asset sale as apportionable
business income or allocable nonbusiness income,230 and from different
states' treatment of section 338(h)(10) gain for purposes of determining
their formulary apportionment factors.231
Similarly, these differences in the relevant state tax law implications of
section 338(h)(10) elections are the primary reasons that multi-state
taxpayers may be subject to more or less than full state taxation on the
338(h)(10) transaction. Thus, neither this over-/under-taxation nor the
resulting concern about equitable treatment of multi-state taxpayers is
avoided by binding taxpayers to their federal elections.232 This possibility
of over-/under-taxation has resulted in significant controversy over the state
tax consequences of federal section 338(h)(10) elections.233
Coordination between the states, either voluntarily through multi-state
action or mandatorily through federal intervention, could reduce the
frequency of these controversies and alleviate the compliance complexity
and fairness concerns that arise in connection with the taxable acquisitions
of multi-state businesses where section 338(h)(10) elections are available.
Moreover, coordination could curtail any efforts by states to export tax to
nonresidents by making strategic choices about whether to bind taxpayers
to their federal 338(h)(10). Neither multi-state coordination nor federal
229 BNA Special Report, supra note 11, at S-94 to S-95. State-to-state differences in
eligibility criteria mean that, upon the acquisition of a target corporation, the election may be
available in one state but not another state. This creates compliance complexity for the
taxpayer whether or not the taxpayers are bound to their federal election for purposes of the
state in which the election is available.
230 Id. at S-96 to S-97. State-to-state differences in the classification of 338(h)(10) gain
can result in the same gain being treated as apportionable for purposes of one state and
allocable for purposes of another state. This creates compliance complexity and the risk of
over-/under-taxation even if taxpayers are bound to their federal elections for state purposes.
231 Id. at S-98 to S-99 (indicating how section 338(h)(10) gain affects each state's
apportionment factor). State-to-state differences in apportionment factors and in how
338(h)(10) gain affects apportionment factors can result in more or less than 100% of the
gain being taxed at the state level (e.g., if fifty percent of the business's sales occur in each
of two states, but both states overweigh the sales factor in their apportionment formulae).
This is true even if 338(h)(10) elections are binding at the state level and even if all states
treat the 338(h)(10) gain as apportionable business or allocable nonbusiness income. See
generally Burgner, supra note 93, at 1108.05(D) (explaining how differences in states'
apportionment formulae can result in multiple taxation for businesses).
232 Binding elections can result in either over- or under-taxation, but independent
elections should result only in the risk of under-taxation assuming rational taxpayers that are
well advised.
233 See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, 7.14.
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intervention regarding the section 338(h)(10) election will likely
accomplish very much, however, unless states also increase coordination
with respect to the underlying state law. This suggests that there may be a
more compelling case for UDITPA reform234 than for binding taxpayers to
their federal section 338(h)(10) elections for state tax purposes.
VII. CONCLUSION
Tax elections in the federal income tax provide taxpayers with choices.
This presents states with choices too, not just about whether to conform to
or decouple from the tax election, but also (where the state conforms to the
election) about whether to bind taxpayers to their federal tax choices.
Different states will make different decisions, based on different policy
tradeoffs.
State-specific policy choices may lead legislators to consider
decoupling from a federal tax election (as many states have with respect to
provisions like bonus depreciation). Or, state-specific policy choices may
lead legislators to conform and allow independent choice because
legislators believe that it is good state policy to provide the election, and
because allowing taxpayers to exercise personal autonomy with respect to
the choice furthers the state-specific objectives of the election itself.
Simplicity and administrability concerns, however, suggest that legislators
should be particularly wary of these options (1) where the election arises
before the state's federal conformity starting point (as with the married
filing status election) and (2) where independent choice pursuant to the
election could lead to non-facial conformity (as with taxpayers who take the
standard deduction for federal purposes, but who want to itemize for state
purposes). Additionally, even where there are compelling state sovereignty
considerations, before decoupling or deciding to conform but allow
independent choice, legislators should consider whether the state-specific
policy objectives can be accomplished another way, so as not to forego the
simplicity and administrability benefits of conformity and binding.
Moreover, legislators should remember that, to the extent their decisions
about election conformity and binding create significant adverse
consequences for other states and/or for multi-state taxpayers, their
decisions increase the risk of federal intervention.
Although this article discusses the foregoing guidance for state
legislators primarily in the context of three explicit tax elections, the
article's recommendations are applicable to a wide variety of tax elections,




including elections such as the business entity classification election and the
election to accelerate the imposition of tax on forfeitable property granted
in exchange for services. 235
Ultimately, concern for simplicity and administrability generally weigh
in favor of conforming to federal tax elections and binding taxpayers to
their federal choices. Sometimes revenue needs trump these considerations,
and sometimes other state-specific policy preferences prevail. Yet, in order
to make an educated decision about state conformity to a federal tax
election, state legislators must appreciate how their choice is affected by the
availability of taxpayer choice.
235 Specifically, a state considering whether to conform to the federal entity
classification election under Treasury Regulation section 301.7701-3 should be wary
because the entity classification election is one of the first critical tax choices for a business,
which will clearly arise prior to the state's federal conformity starting point. Additionally, a
state considering whether to conform to the federal section 83(b) election should consider
the risk of non-facial conformity that would result if the taxpayer made the election for state
purposes but not federal purposes (i.e., for state tax purposes, the property would have to be
valued upon grant, but no such current valuation would be needed for federal purposes).
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